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AN ABSTRACT OF THE STUDY
The study of Henry VII’s expedition is divided into six 
categories. The first examines the sources for 1492, for which 
unfortunately there are so few. The main source, William Cope’s 
Account, gives us an insight of what was to follow later in the reign 
with regard to financial matters.
The second chapter traces the Expedition from the conception of 
the idea to its conclusion with the King and his army safely returned to 
England. Henry was well satisfied with the Treaty of Etaples, and with 
the savings from the Expedition’s expenses.
Thirdly the study examines the Military and Naval forces involved. 
Both are difficult to assess, given on the one hand a missing section 
from the accounts, and on the other the problem of double entries in the 
account.
The problem of supplies forms the basis for the fourth chapter and 
reveals the depth of preparations and a surety that the troops would not 
suffer from the lack of any commodities.
The largest and singularly significant chapter deals with the 
finance. This is what most scholars have noted this expedition for and 
the fifth examines the debit and credit side of the accounts, their 
balance, and indicates the surplus that has been made so much of by so 
many!
The sixth chapter examines the level of support Henry VII received 
for the expedition, which sections of society were most behind his plans 
and to what extent were these the King's traditional supporters.
Whether this was a successful expedition is a question tackled in 
the conclusion, while the Appendices contain some interesting extracts 




AN ABSTRACT OF THE STUDY 1
Chapter
1. THE SOURCES FOR 1492: A SUMMARY AND BRIEF
ANALYSIS. 3
2. THE EXPEDITION 1492: AN OUTLINE OF THE
EVENTS FROM ITS CONCEPTION TO ITS CONCLUSION. 9
3. THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES INVOLVED IN 1492. 33
4. SUPPLY FOR THE ARMY 49
5. THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT: A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS? 59






THE SOURCES FOR 1942: A SUMMARY AND BRIEF ANALYSIS
4
By 1492 the Anglicising process, accelerated by the Hundred 
Years War, has left the major proportion of sources for the expedition 
written in English. Many official documents such as Tellers’ Rolls and 
Exchequer Receipts were written in Latin, but no significant details 
were to be found there. This has simplified the analysis, although 
English Court Hand of the late fifteenth century presents its own 
problems, some of which prove extremely difficult even for the experts. 
I am indebted to these experts, namely the officers of the Public Record 
Office, for their help and patience with me, especially considering the 
often untidy nature of some of the sources . My main indebtedness is to 
Margaret Condon at P.R.O. She has been especially responsible for the 
repair and recataloguing of many of the sources I found relevant for the 
expedition and she particularly helped in deciphering some of the more 
difficult passages. Her work continues; indeed during my research Miss 
Condon brought several documents to my attention, most notably 
’Hatcliffe’s Account'^ and the ’Ordnances for the Invasion of France 
1942’.2
The most valuable of all sources relevant to 1492 has
undoubtedly been that found under Class E36 part 285. It is now
contained in a large bound book, originally many gatherings, put
together through the work of Miss Condon, and to which sections are
occasionally being correctly inserted after recataloguing. This is the
3 ’Account of William Cope, Deputy of Reynolde Bray, Treasurer of War'.
NOTES
1. Public Record Office E36/208, The Account of W. Hatcliffe. All 
references to manuscript material are to documents in the Public 
Record Office. Hereafter, therefore, they are cited without the 
prefix P.R.O.
2. E/163/22/3/3; E163/22/3/15; E163/22/3/23 (colophm).
3. William Cope 1450-1513, a yeoman of the Crown 1485-95, M.P.for 
Ludgershall 1491-2. He received many appointments, both prior to 
and after the invasion. Cofferer of the Household 1495-1507 and 
Constable of Porchester June 1509.
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It contains accounts of money appertaining to the 1492 expedition and is 
dated from 31 January 1492 to 31 January 1501, indicating the problems 
which the Benevolence Collectors found. All entries are by Cope and his 
sole responsibility is reinforced by the lack of entries signed, 
countersigned, annotated or in any way marked by Bray. It is 
incomplete, that is, there are two major omissions. The first falls 
within the section on Benevolence payments^- and the second terminates 
the wages accounts abruptly before they are completed. Here, in the 
second omission, a complete gathering of wages entries is estimated to
, 3be missing which could be as much as thirty two pages. More 
importantly these contain the sum totals, making analysis of the 
complete expeditionary army extremely difficult. Elsewhere the account 
is a detailed statement for numerous aspects of the expedition. It 
accounts for part of the financial income for the invasion and precisely 
how this sum of money was expended, the final account indicating a 
surplus which was removed to the King’s Chamber.
The account lists, albeit incompletely; names of retinue leaders, 
numbers in their retinues, wages and in some cases distances travelled 
to reach the musters and ensuing travel expenses. Interestingly, the 
fleet necessary to ship the army to France is extensively detailed for 
English vessels, though not for the Dutch fleet engaged where only 
numbers are given.^
NOTES
1 E36/285, fl4a, fl4b. These contain only parts of a number of 
entries and more is still to be found.
2 E36/285, f50 the wages end abruptly in payment to William
Middleton.
3 Miss M. Condon’s estimate.
4 The details contained could form the basis of a study of English
shipping cl492, entries include ship’s name, musters or owners and 
ports of origin. Although exact vessel tonnage was not included 
there are details in Hatcliffe’s Account E36/208. E36/285,f63-72. 
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The account contains extensive details of expenses for the Navy, both 
stores and wages, and some repair work.^ Sections bear reference to 
’Ordnance’ and the ’Kings Work’ while supplies destined for the troops 
in France are listed under large global payments to individuals and 
groups such as John Dawtry, William Hatcliffe and the Merchants of the 
Staple.Significantly this account is in English, is readily 
decipherable and contains some remarkable information. So extensive is 
its coverage of the expedition that this source has formed the basis for 
this work.
Complementary to Cope's Account is one that was brought to my 
attention late in my research due to incorrect cataloguing. This is 
'Ratcliffe's Account'.William Hatcliffe was the King's Avener, a 
'muster roller' and a man with many other financial responsibilities 
during the expedition. His account is in Latin and contains numerous 
entries supplementing many of the omissions of Cope's Account. One 
instance of this is where Cope lists payments for shipping the force to 
France he fails to give details of vessel size and tonnage. Hatcliffe 
list many of the same ships used in the repassage of the army and some 
other duties, but includes their tonnage, the numbers of troops they 
carried (not in the repassage lists unfortunately) and the size of their 
crews. In the repassage lists he also names retinue captains on board 
returning to England and in so doing, confirms the participation of many 






5. E36/208, The Account of William Hatcliffe and hereafter simply
E36/208.
7
Consequently a more precise analysis of the expeditionary force can be 
attempted, yet its nature remains somewhat imprecise many details are 
still lacking.
Hatcliffe’ Account contains interesting details of the composition 
of mercenary artillery batteries employed at the siege of Sluys, the 
victuals purchased to supply the army in France, and travel expenses and 
wages of some contingents not found in Cope, presumably contained within 
the missing gathering.
The third source which has been instrumental to the analysis is 
found in E101 Bundle 72 files 3, 5, and 6. These are the Indentures for 
War and Provision made between Henry and his subjects between 25 
February 1492 and 12 August 1492. There are ninety-seven indentures to 
provide retinues and three to supply provisions. The retinue indentures 
indicate that a much smaller force was gathered than the wage account 
reveals, but there were probably other indentures which have not 
survived. However, they do give retinues not included in either Cope or 
Hatcliffe and assuming promises were kept, these can be used to augment 
the incomplete section in Cope.
One final comment needs to be made about sources available for 1492. A 
document survives which is of such a nature that it could not be 
included in detail in the final analysis. This is ’Ordnances for the 
Invasion of France 1492’.^ Information contained within this document 
requires a wider analysis than this work sets out to cover. It is 
apparent from this document and from references to it in both the 
Indentures and the Statute relevant to the expedition, that Henry issued 
this Book of Ordnances to all his retinue captains. It contains rules
NOTES
1 E163/22/3/3; E163/22/3/15; E163/22/3/23 (colophm) 
8
that were most prescriptive and were to be read to all troops and 
strictly enforced while on active duty during the campaign. To what 
degree Henry based the idea for such 'ordnances’ upon earlier theories 
and enactments, such as Vegetius and Henry V’s Rules, requires extensive 
research. Briefly, the Book of Ordnances contains twenty-nine pages of 
codes relating to the behaviour of troops in many situations; behaviour 
in camp, during enemy raids, the capture of hostages and division of the 
ransom, and the exclusion of all women from within a three mile radius 
of their camps. This book was printed between 17 October 1491 and the 
army’s departure in October 1492 by Richard Pynson. Unfortunately time 
has taken its toll and it is in an imperfect condition, many pages being 
damaged or entirely lacking; more problematical, however, is that it has 
not been preserved in its original order, except the first and last 
pages. An attempt has been made to indicate its ordering,but the 
writer’s emphasis is on its being an early printed book rather than on 
its place within a history of war.
Mention has been made of this source, and an example given in the 
Appendix, as it was felt that the existence of such a unique document 
should be more widely known. Research into this document’s origins 
would have required more than this work entailed and was therefore not 
attempted.
NOTE
1. D.E. Rhodes, 
6th sc., iii,




THE EXPEDITION OF 1492:
AN OUTLINE OF THE EVENTS FROM ITS CONCEPTION
TO ITS CONCLUSION.
10
Henry VII*s expedition to France in 1492 is not the most well- 
known invasion of France during the latter Middle Ages, and is 
considerably overshadowed by that of his namesake seventy years 
previously. Henry VII could not have wished involvement in 
international affairs so early in his reign, with his own position only 
just secured. His diplomacy confirms this. The intention had been to 
secure Anne of Britanny's position without recourse to arms, or at least 
with only minimal English involvement. In April 1489, 6000 English 
archers had been despatched to Anne in the hope that they would dissuade 
any further French intervention. The Treaty of Medina de Campo one 
month earlier had seen the signing of an agreement supposedly to 
frighten the French off.^ Yet, Henry had underestimated the parties 
involved. Maximilian was too involved elsewhere to be more than a 
’proxy’ ally, the Spanish only sent token aid, while Charles VIII was 
determined to bring the Breton Lamb into the French fold in spite of the 
English Lion and the Hapsburg Wolf. Anne herself was unable to resist 
the King’s advances.
Even before Charles had pushed the matter beyond doubt and married 
Anne ’personally’ in December 1491, Henry and his council had realised 
that diplomacy had failed and military action was needed. It was hoped 
that this would be joint Austrian, Spanish and English, with as little 
emphasis upon the English as Henry could possibly manage. In June 1491 
the Great Council made their decision and authorised Henry to go to war 
with France and partly finance it with a Benevolence, the confirmation 
stating ’Ad instancium et specialem requisicionem tam dominorum 
spintualium et temporalium quam aliorum nobilium’.
NOTES
1. S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII, 1972, p 80.
2. Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae...Ed.,T. Rymer (2nd.edn.,20 vols.,
London, 1726-35), xii, p 466.
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Henry’s first action was towards collection of the money necessary 
to raise an army. On 7 July 1491 a commission was granted to many 
officials around England ’to go...and require the assistance of the 
King's subjects there in this arduous affair, each one according to his 
means.The request for a benevolence, although significant itself, 
gives the earliest documentary evidence of Henry’s intention. He 
claimed the throne of France as 'Charles of France not only unjustly 
occupies the king’s realm of France and his duchies of Normandy, Anjou,
9Touraine and Aquitaine.' Henry also tried to involve a sense of fear 
of French invasion once Britanny was lost, stating Charles 'threatens 
the destruction of this his realm of England.' His full intention was 
'to defend his English subjects and to enter France with a power and 
indicate his rights.'^ Henry probably hoped that this threat would be 
sufficient and the necessity for an invasion would not arise. The 
collection of finances continued and was to be fully documented, each 
commissioner had to record each individual payment and 'certify the King 
and Council what they do.'^ This level of documentation would appear 
excessive but was rigidly adhered to. Most of the country was to be 
visited and is confirmed upon inspection of the register of payments 
kept by William Cope in his accounts.
Cope's register does not date each payment but the whole account 
was completed between 31 January 1492 and 31 January 1501. The amounts 
received vary considerably from group to group and within each group.
B which contains a selection from E36/285 f6-15.
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Financial analysis is dealt with later, but it is interesting to note 
here that the country’s distribution of wealth is clearly demonstrated. 
Winchester and London stand out, their Bishops paying £1500 and £666 
respectively, the Prior of St. Swithin’s in Winchester gave £333.6s.8d. 
while the Dean of St. Paul's gave £200.In comparison Chester and 
Worcester were either poor or more reluctant to help. Their Bishops 
only gave £100. In total the clergy gave £5523.6s.8d. Of the Lords 
Temporal, unsurprisingly the King’s mother, the Countess of Richmond, 
was most generous giving £666.13s.4d. The Benevolence eventually 
totalled £48489.16s8d. and was necessary as the original Parliamentary 
grant was unable to raise sufficient funds to launch the invasion the 
King originally intended.
Parliament had been requested and had agreed to supply £100,000 to 
pay for the maintenance of 10,000 archers for one year. It was apparent 
by October 1491 that the earlier grants had not succeeded in raising 
this sum. The fourth Parliament of the reign meeting on Monday 17 
October agreed to raise £75000 through a further tenth and fifteenth. 
The final £25000 was agreed by the Convocation of Canterbury.
This Parliament did not only consider the financial side of the 
invasion. A number of laws pertaining to the collection of the army 
were passed. Concern was shown that the nobles would supply only the 
best troops and all were to be fully equipped. Reference to the
troops' behaviour and the duty of both his captains and soldiers while 
engaged during the campaign was also made. Notwithstanding this, Henry 
ordered the printing of a book which contained all the regulations and 
NOTES
1. E36/285, f6 also Appendix B.
2. E36/285, f7.
3. The Statutes at Large, 1763, ed., Robert Banket, Henry Woodfall, 
William Straham, p 80-81.
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more, instructing they were to be read to and familiarized by all his 
troops. These regulations were despatched to the printer Richard Pynson 
on the same day as the fourth Parliament opened, no time was to be 
wasted. They were considerable and survive in sufficient detail to give 
a clear picture of the King’s code of behaviour and a selection have 
been reproduced in the appendix for the reader.
These preparations were intended to force Charles VIII to back 
down, but had quite the opposite effect. Charles married Anne, in 
person, 6 December 1491, seemingly sealing the matter. Henry was now in 
a quandary, he had promised Anne and Brittany their liberty and now both 
were apparently lost. Henry also did not know how far Maximilian would 
go to keep his side of the agreement and assumed both he, and presumably 
Spain, would be prepared to fight. In 1491 this was probably what their 
respective Ambassadors led him to believe. Preparations continued 
accordingly, the intention to cross the channel and force the issue in 
person being made widely known. Deep down Henry probably secretly hoped 
his allies would take some action of their own which would save him the 
trouble. Henry found his requests for such action were only met with 
promises and later excuses.
Henry had cast the die; preparation continued and the invasion set 
for late May or early June. This early invasion date is confirmed 
through commissions issued early in 1492 for collection and manufacture 
of military supplies. On 20 January 1492 James Hede was issued with a 
writ, by Henry personally, to take ’houses, land, vessels, wood, coals 
and other fuel, and also artificers, labourers, and workmen for the 




E163 22/3/3 & see Appendix E.
C.P.R. 1485-1495. Vol.l, p 395 
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ant and a siege train would play an important role in Henry's plans. 
Transport was not neglected either. It was as significant in the late 
fifteenth century as it is today. On 24 February 1492 Henry issued 
numerous commissions for the provision of 'charyat horse...sumpter 
horses... draught horses and labourers and carters for transport of the 
King's ordnance.1
February was a period of intense activity at Westminster. 
Supplies and transport were two aspects of the army. The intention to 
have 3000 mounted troops, either knights, demilancers or mounted archers 
would require sizable quantities of special supplies. On 24 February 
Thomas Woodrow, clerk of the King's ordnance, and Richard Bright, 
purveyor of the avenary and livery of the King's horses, received a 
special commission. They were to proceed to Southampton, the intended 
port of departure, and there buy 'liveries, 
hay...litter...provender...Carts of barrels and nets...slynges...and 
briggs.. .sycles.. .and sithes.' It would take time for such a large 
force to muster so such stables and local supplies would have been 
necessary. The nets, slings and bridges indicate the physical problem 
associated with loading animals on board ship with the minimal amount of 
fuss and harm to them. 'Sycles and sithes' reinforces the May date, 
French hay would be ready to harvest and would solve the problem of 
taking such supplies with them.
NOTES
Ibid. pp 394-395. Yet these commissions were only for the 
Midland and Southern counties, issued by pairs of counties to 
groups of three individuals, for example; Richard Slyhurst, John 
Wytton and Robert Cotis for the counties of Oxford and Berkshire.
2. The avenary was the stable.
3. C.P.R, 1485-94 Vol.l. P396.
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The May invasion plans are further supported by four other references. 
William Cope accounts for a payment to John French, yeoman of the crown, 
for retaining ships in the counties of Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk and 
Lincoln for the King’s navy on 10 February 1492.1
William Paston, in his letter to Sir John Paston, observed that 
the King’s preparations were well under way, the King was daily 
gathering supplies and ordnance on the coast and that the whole
9 expedition ’Wol be goyng sone upon Easter.' The letter was dated 18 
February 1492. The haste is further attested to as William mentioned he 
would be buying all his equipment in Calais, he had no time to do so in 
England.
The indenting of supply further supports the May invasion date. 
Edward Newchurch, a pewtrer of London, was contracted to supply three 
pipes of wheat flour, fifteen pipes of beer, one pipe of beef for the 
Royal Army when it left the country on 20 May. This indenture was 
signed on 25 February and is a clear statement of intent. A second 
indenture reinforces this. William Attlayn, John Prowde and John Lappe, 
Haberdasher of London, also contracted to supply provisions for 20 May, 
signing their agreement on 16 March.
Final confirmation for an invasion during late May, or even early 
June, are the Indentures with the nobility, knights and squires to 
provide troops for the army. All troops musters were to be taken 
between 24 May and 20 June, the majority, 72 out of 88, falling within 
the period 1 June and 9 June. These indentures are signed between 6
NOTES
1. E36/285/, f62. For this he received £6.13s.4d.
2. The Paston Letters, vol.6, pl43, ed. J. Gairdner, (1910).
3. E101/72/3 No 1.
4. E101/72/3 No 5.
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March 1492 and 10 June 1492.1
Henry’s intention was an invasion in May, but doubts had begun to 
creep into his mind from the middle of May onwards. The indentures 
themselves help foster this impression as 25 were not dated. Yet May 
was the original intention and Southampton the port to launch it from. 
Woodrove and Bright were to arrange supplies there, 39 indentures state 
Winchester for their muster, but five state Portsmouth. It is most 
probable that both would have been necessary to launch such a large 
force. Portsmouth is referred to in other references. Commissions 
refer to equipment and stores destined for Portsmouth while additional 
docking facilities were needed to make this possible and for the future 
increase in the Royal Navy. William Cope registers the account of 
Robert Brickesdon, King’s shipwright, ordered by Reynolde Bray to build
2 a dock at Portsmouth for the King’s ships.
At what point May had become an impossible date for the invasion 
is difficult to decide. Circumstances had changed and news of them came 
from Christopher Urswick, Dean of York, and Sir John Risely. These had 
been sent to Maximilian's court to liaise with the Emperor, inform him 
of Henry’s plans and request Maximilian's own plans. They sent Henry 
news he least wanted to hear. Henry's court had been a hive of 
activity, as has been shown, and Urswick and Risely would have expected 
similar at Maximilian's. When they arrived in Flanders 'they reported
NOTES
1. E101/72/3, 4, 5 and 6. Only one is dated 10 June; Thomas Darcy 
and he agreed to bring his troops to Winchester the previous day, 
9 June 1492!
2. E36/285, f78. The work also included 'doing something to the 
Sovereign' and he was paid £241.13s.4d.
Robert also built a beer house and a tower and blockhouse at 
Portsmouth for a total payment of £2099.16s.4d. f73. Professor 
Mackie has stated that three breweries were built at Portsmouth 
and this is confirmation of at least one. The Earlier Tudors 
1485-1558 (Oxford 1952) pl07. -------------------  
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that Maximilian was...unprepared to undertake operations and that 
consequently the King should not rely upon Maximilian’s assistance.It 
is difficult to date when Henry received this news, but clues do exist. 
Most indentures are dated up to 21 May 1492, while 25 have no date so 
this information must have arrived on or soon after this date.
This news would have shocked and angered Henry, but he probably 
expected something of the sort given earlier excuses. He was now in a 
trap. Maximilian’s inability to fulfil his promises meant Henry could 
not successfully invade in May. Alternatively to back down would damage 
his own precarious position. Much of the money had been collected and 
was in the treasury with a second tenth and fifteenth due on St. 
Martin’s, 11 November 1492. If the invasion was abandoned Henry could 
expect to be accused of defrauding people and never really countenancing 
the invasion. Henry would lose face and English pride would be mocked. 
Additionally there were those who might capitalise on a decline in the 
King’s popularity. Perkin Warbeck was beginning to gain notoriety in 
foreign courts and there were those who would risk anything to replace 
the House of Tudor with the House of York. In fact between late 1491 
and early 1492 Warbeck was in Ireland attempting to stir rebellion at 
the precise instigation of Charles VIII.
Henry kept this news secret, only a handful of his closest 
advisers would have been privy to the information. Operations had to be 
slowed down unobtrusively and indicative of this Henry moved his court 
to Shene during May. On 7 May the Keeper of the Privy Purse paid 
£12.5s.6d. for 'sphere, spherehedes and vanplatesfor the King's
NOTES
!• The Anglica Historia of Polydore Vergil 1485-1537, ed. D. Hay,
Camden Society, 3rd Ser., LXX1V1, (1950), p53.
2. Excerpta Historica, ed. S. Bentley, (London, 1833), p85. 
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personal armour while at Shene during May. On 8 May Gilwyn Ap Rice 
appeared at Shene with a number of horses and was paid £47.6s.8d. for 
them^ while on the same day Henry bought a new sword case and new harp 
case for James Hides. Henry did not remain at Shene all the time. He 
travelled back to Westminster when the occasion demanded to keep up the 
outward appearance that preparations were still under way. On 9 May he 
issued a commission to John Gervys to gather a group of carpenters and 
buy timber for the invasion, while on the same day Henry indicated his 
intention to dramatically increase the size of his invasion army and at 
the same time delay its departure. Two new officials were despatched to 
either reinforce or replace John French’s earlier work in retaining 
ships. Anthony Legs and Henry Broke visited the same areas as French, 
but added to them the county of York.^ With this evidence one can work 
out when Henry planned his new invasion. If French needed four months 
to gather ships in time for May or June then so too would Legs and 
Broke, indicating an invasion in late September, early October. This 
confirms the dramatic change in plans in May.
Henry spent some time at Shene, probably over the despatches from 
Urswick and Risely, not perhaps with the same 'fear and despair' that 
Vergil attributed to him.^ Here in greater privacy he could discuss the
NOTES
1. E36/285, f74
2. Excerpta Histórica, p85.
3. C.P.R. 1485-1494. Vol.l., p397.
4. E36/285, f62.
5. Angelica Historia p54.
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situation with his councillors, probably Morton, Bray, Daubeney, Lovell 
and Robert Guildford. Here also discussion most likely took place to 
increase the army, and equip a force to send to Sluys, perhaps hoping 
that Maximilian might take some action if Henry helped him in some way. 
A second expeditionary force was subsequently ordered, fitted out and 
sent against the pirates at Sluys. These were a problem for both 
Maximilian and any seafaring nation such as England, and the Emperor had 
been unsuccessfully attempting to reduce their stronghold. Sluys had 
been taken by Philip Mounsure, Count of Ravenstein, leader of the Hooks, 
turned into a base for the pirates and filled with Danish mercenaries. 
Trying to dislodge them had been a steady drain on the Emperor’s 
reserves. During the summer of 1492, Ravenstein was leading a staunch 
resistance to Maximilian’s general, Albert of Saxony, and Henry decided 
to send a small fleet and army, led by Sir Edward Poynings, to help in 
the siege. Hall in his chronicle mistakenly puts the departure of this 
force in Henry's sixth year; more conclusive evidence is found in Cope. 
Under the section of payments to 'John Underdale captain of 12 ships 
sent to Scluse' we discover Poynings and the company were paid wages and 
travel expenses for arriving between 13 July and 25 July 1492.After 
gathering in London during that period it was marched to Sandwich where 
it took ship for the siege. Poynings was commander and Sir John 
Turbervill, treasurer of the town and marches of Calais, was in charge 
of finance and supplies. Turbervill received £2000 from Thomas Harley 
for wages and a further £141.6s.8d. for 1885 Jagnettes for the troops.
NOTES
1. E36/285, f74-75.
2. Ibid. A jagnette was a type of quilted jacket, perhaps reinforced 
with plates of metal, for protection for archers.
20
This indicates that the size of the force was at least 1885 troops, but 
more likely nearer 2500 troops.
Poynings’ force acquitted itself well, it helped in the fall of 
the castle of Sluys in October. Most probably it arrived in August when 
Albert of Saxony and Poynings spent some time in discussion as to the 
best utilisation of the fresh troops and the English fleet. The plan 
decided on had the English fleet and troops attacking Sluys from the 
seaward side; the Germans attacked by land.^ Hall’s account describes 
the harbour protected by castles on either side of the river mouth, 
joined by a bridge of boats. The assault began 24 September and took 
twenty days; during this time Sir George de Vere, brother of the Earl of 
Oxford, and fifty other Englishmen were killed. The lesser of the two 
harbour castles was heavily assaulted and the boat bridge fired by 
Poynings’ men. Such losses made it impossible for Philip Mounsure to 
hold out, yielding soon after to Poynings. Hall states that Poynings 
remained at Sluys for some time, yet Cope’s accounts do not agree. 
Payments of wages and travel expenses were paid to Poynings from as 
early as 11 October 1492, but the siege only officially ended 15 October 
1492. The majority of Poynings’ force joined up with Henry outside 
Bolougne on 22 October with Poynings arriving on 23 October.
Among Henry's preparations he had to safeguard the realm during 
his absence. A regency council was necessary, Prince Arthur was too 
young to be left otherwise. Henry VII’s council registers are lost
NOTES
1. Edward Hall, Chronicle containing the History of England, Ed.,H. 
Ellis, (London, 1809), p452.
2. E36/285, f26-37. Two archers of Sir Sampson Norton’s retinue at 
Sluys arrived and were paid separately in the accounts from 11 
October. Probably they brought messages of the impending fall of 
Sluys.
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except for a worn parchment which has been traced to this period.It 
does not bear date or direction, yet its references clearly put it in
91491-2, certainly no later than August 1492. This ordinance created 
Arthur’s regency council for the preservation of peace and justice, yet 
it also contains a justification for the invasion and propaganda against 
the ’great tirany of France'. Who were members of this council remains 
unknown and only speculation is possible. M. Condon speculates upon 
fifteen, possibly including the chancellor, John Morton, the treasurer 
John, Lord Dynham and perhaps Jasper duke of Bedford, the King’s uncle. 
Reference to Prince Arthur and his councillors was made on 5 May 1491, 
but this was too early to refer to a specific council set up for the 
King's absence.It was not until 2 August 1492 that the King made the 
normal proclamation concerning the defence of the realm during his 
absence.This ordered the Sheriff of Kent, Mayor of Canterbury, Philip 
Lewes, Lieutenant of Dover Castle and the Cinque Ports to be prepared in 
the event of a French raid during the King's absence.
During the latter stage of preparations Henry was most likely 
agitated, nervously ensuring all was ready. He was clearly restless and 
mobile. On 2 August he was in Canterbury, probably having seen the 
troops for Sluys leave earlier from Sandwich. On 12 August, possibly 
back at Westminster, he issued another indenture of supply to John 
NOTES
1 C.82/329/53 as quoted by M. Condon in 'An Anachronism with intent' 
Henry VIII's Council ordinance of 1491-92*, (Unpublished paper).
2. Ibid, Miss Condon shows this through the King's sign manual, his 
first rather than his second which he adopted inconsistently from 
18 July and exclusively from 28 August 1492.
3. Ibid, The evidence for Bedford remaining in England is not 
conclusive. He did not sign the petition for peace, and his 
retinue was led by his squire, Owen Ap Janken, E30/612, f45.
4. C.P.R. 1485-1494, Vol.l.pp356-8.
5. Ibid, p400.
6. Tudor Royal Proclamations, Vol.l The Early Tudors 1485-1553 pp30- 
31, ed. P.L. Hughes and J.F. Larkin, C.S.V. 1964. Such an order 
required a search for all able bodied men to be registered 
together with the equipment they could furnish and the list 
dispatched to the King.
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Warme, a buterer of Calais.
On 28 August the King was at Greenwich where he received his new 
'hede peces' from John Shaw the King’s Goldsmith.2 On 24 August Henry 
was back at Westminster issuing commissions for more transport horses,
3 this time in counties not previously covered.
With preparations under way the court moved closer to the port of 
departure, changed by August from Portsmouth or Southampton to Sandwich, 
important in its proximity to France with the advancing season. On 7 
September Henry was at Maidstone, but for most of the month he based 
himself at Canterbury.
Preparations for the invasion had taken nearly a year, the date 
had been postponed at least once and the actual crossing of the channel 
was to take in total nearly a month. From 4 September regular shipments 
of supplies and ordnance were made to Calais from various English ports, 
notably Southampton where much of it had been stockpiled.Kent had 
become the centre of operations during the autumn 1492; ships arrived 
from 2 September, the King’s ’beofe and multons’^ arrived from 
Buckingham and other places in the South of England. The first troops 
to arrive were of the retinue of Sir Maurice Berkeley, 13 September at 
Canterbury, having travelled 150 miles from Grantham. The remainder of 
the army gathered either at Canterbury or mustered directly at Sandwich 
during the last two weeks of September. Only a small number of retinues
NOTES
1. E101/72/6 No.18. John Warme agreed to supply 3 lasts of flour, 
20m pipes of beer, 20 quarts of oats, ten weyes of cheese, and ten 
pipes of beef.
2. E36/285, f74. These were expensive items decorated in ’golde, 
perle and stone' and cost the sum of £1970.7s.9d.
3. C.P.R. 1485-94. Vol.l. p404.
4. E36/285, f56, p56 & p61. John Solen shipped 6 tonnes of wine and
2 buttes of salt on the 4th September, ’3 charottes’ on 7
September. John Dawtrey shipped ordnance 8 September.
5. Ibid, f54, p54. Multons were whole sheep for eating. 
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arrived late, that is in early October, most notable amongst these being 
Robert Willoughby Lord Broke, steward of the King’s House, who arrived 
by 1 October.1
While overseeing preparations Henry issued two special licences, 
unusual in that considering their nature there were only two. On 14 
September Charles Somerset, captain of the King’s guard, was allowed to 
alienate a number of manors, without paying a fine to the crown, during 
his time abroad with the King. The second on 20 September allowed 
William More, a King’s sergeant at arms, to stay in England with John 
Morton, the Archbishop of Canterbury, without paying the fines as
9 prescribed by Act of Parliament.
Final preparations were made during the last week of September. 
On 23 September Robert Willoughby de Broke, was made Marshal of the Army 
in his absence. Supplies had been underestimated; between 24 and 30 
September a further five merchants were licenced to ’purvey victuals’ 
for the army. The increased army must have increased beyond the 
councillors’ expectations.
By October all was ready, or almost all. Two items remained; a 
favourable wind, something outside Henry’s control; and the licence 
giving Prince Arthur authority while the King was abroad. The council 
ordinance establishing the regency has been mentioned, yet this was only 
empowered through a special licence. This was not issued until the last 
moment which was on 2 October. Arthur’s duties were specifically 
outlined beginning with his religious duties; ’to grant licences to 
elect to conventual, but not Cathedral Chapters... to receive fealties
NOTES
1. Ibid, f21.
2. C.P.R., 1485-94. Vol.l, p405. The Statutes at Large, p80-81.
3. C.P.R., 1485-94. Vol.l, p415. John Taillow of Satflete Haryn,
Co.Lincoln; 27 September; 27 September Nicholas Dyker and John
Mathen; 30 September John Hammond and Thomas Freyr. 
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or election of minor prelates, but not....greater prelates, without the 
King’s command.’ Arthur was made Keeper of England and Henry's 
Lieutenant, and given the power to appoint a ’fitting person to hold the 
pleas of Marshalsea.’1 Considerable though these duties were, for a 
boy of six, they were only theoretical. His presence would be required 
for observation and education into the art of kingship, but the licence 
was in effect only a limit upon the powers of the regency council. The 
council ordinance confirms this by only concerning itself with the 
upholding of justice and with the dispensation of patronage. Henry was 
clearly not prepared, even in this instance, to delegate any of his 
prerogative powers and it is doubtful whether Arthur’s council was ever
• • 2intended to exercise major administrative duties,
The army and fleet which gathered at Sandwich will be discussed in 
detail later. Suffice to say, the fleet consisted of the Sovereign and 
Regent, approximately 335 Dutch ships and 300 English ships. Legs, 
Broke and French had executed their tasks well, while Sir Richard Nanfan 
and Philip Loker were responsible for the Dutch Hoyes. A fuller 
discussion of the army will be made later; it was by my reckoning in 
excess of 14000 troops, the largest army to have left England in the 
fifteenth century.
The date of Henry’s departure causes debate. Power was handed 
over to Arthur and his council on 2 October 1492 and from 9 October to 
15 december 1492 all entries on the Patent Rolls were attested by the 
young Prince of Wales.The Privy Purse expenses put Henry in Calais at 
11 o’clock 2 October, having crossed the channel in a vessel called 
NOTES
1. Ibid, pp407-8.
2. M. Condon’s paper on Council Ordinance.
3. E36/285, f59 & f78.
4. C.P.R. 1425-94 Vol.l, pp401-402.
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1 7the Swan.1 Yet, if we believe Vergil and John Stowe (who used Vergil 
extensively), Henry had been in France since 6 September, this must be a 
simple confusion of months. The Chronicle of Calais agrees with 2 
October while Hall and the Chronicle of London prefer 6 October. My 
preference is 2 October with Henry arriving in Calais at 11 p.m. The 
crossing appears to have been peaceful and pleasant; minstrels and Dego 
the Spanish fool entertained the King suitably; they were rewarded with 
13s.4d. and 6s.8d. respectively. Even the sailors were rewarded, 
receiving £6.13s.4d., while the boat crew who rowed the King ashore 
received 40 shillings.Henry was well pleased when he landed in 
Calais; so far the omens appeared in his favour.
The main body of the army took much more time to cross. The first 
two weeks of October saw considerable fleet activity. During this time, 
in the safe confines of the Marches of Calais, Henry arrayed his order 
of battle and sent out scouting parties to watch for the French. Henry 
need not have worried, Charles VIII apparently had not expected Henry to 
invade despite all the arrangements to the contrary. While Henry was at 
Calais, Urswick and Risely returned from their mission. It became plain 
to all that Maximilian would give no assistance. This, according to 
Vergil, did not shake the English in the least, it strengthened their 
resolve, but surprised them that Maximilian ’could remain passive’.It 
is doubtful whether the English were as resolute as Vergil states, but
NOTES
1. Excerpta Histórica op cit, p85.
2. Annales, or a General Chronicle of England (1631). John Stowe, 
p476.
3. The Chronicle of Calais in The Reign of Henry VII and Henry VIII 
to the Year 1540, ed. J.C. Nichols, Camden Series (1144), p2.
4. Excerpta Histórica, Op cit, p85.
5. Anglica Historia, p55.
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their morale probably improved considerably when the news from Sluys 
arrived. The port did not fall until 13 October but the situation had 
been grave days earlier and some of Poynings’ men arrived in Calais from 
11 October onwards.
Charles VIII had not been prepared to take any military action 
against Henry. He was too embroiled with the prospect of Italy and so 
was contented with simply ordering all towns to defend themselves. His 
main initiative was diplomacy. Philippe de Querdes, governor of 
Artois, was despatched to Calais with instructions to make a peaceful 
settlement. Vergil states that this was before Henry crossed the 
channel; Hall agrees (unsurprisingly), but the Chronicle of Calais 
states the meeting did not take place until Henry actually laid siege to 
Boulogne. Philippe des Querdes was met by Giles Lord Daubeney and later 
joined by Richard, Bishop of Exeter. If des Querdes had only arrived 
when the siege had begun (18 October according to the Privy Purse, 19 
October by Stowe, 23 October in the Chronicle of Calais) then the terms 
were concluded very speedily by 27 October when Henry showed his army 
the memorial purporting to be a request from his captains and 
councillors advising him to accept the peace terms offered through des 
Querdes. Henry probably used this document to smooth the way for the 
eventual announcement of peace. For this to be so, some activity had 
clearly taken place between Charles and Henry before the latter had 
crossed the channel. This document does not read as one drawn up in a 
short space of time, and while on march in enemy territory.
NOTES
1. See n.2 p20.
2. Philipe de Creveccour, Seigneur des Querdes et Laney, Marshal of 
France, Lieutenant and Captain General in Artois and Picardy 
Foedera, p497.
3. E30/612, printed, with a severely truncated and bowdlerized list 
of signatories in Foedera, XI1 490-4. The signatures are badly
galled and sometimes illegible, so that it is difficult to be 
precise about numbers.
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Despite the distinct probability that negotiations for peace were 
well under way, the forward battle still left Calais before 14 October. 
It attacked the town of Ardes on the border between the March of Calais 
and France. This ’Betinge downe of the towne of Ardes’cannot have 
been difficult as the battle commanders met up with Henry and the main 
army at the small village of Margyson (or Margeson) on 15 October, 
Henry had spent the previous night at Sandy felds (or Saunderford). The 
forward battle had been led by the Earl of Oxford, together with an 
impressive array of nobles.
Morale must have been high, first the victory at Sluys and now a 
victory at Ardes. On 16 October both the forward and the King’s wards 
marched in four columns to Wimelle, a town only four miles from 
Boulogne and fitting in with the average marching rate for an army of 
this period: 5 miles a day. The rate of only four to five miles a day 
appears rather slow, but was not considering the ordnance, siege train 
and supplies being moved; the lateness of the season hampering progress; 
and the tentativeness of moving in enemy territory.
By 18 October Boulogne was under siege, engines and bombards 
placed in position. The siege, however, was not to be a great victory 
for the English. Firstly, the town was ’a very strong place, contrary 
to all expectations’ as Henry informed the Pope later on.^ If the
NOTES
1. The Chronicle of Calais, op cit, p2.
2. Ibid, p2. All the details of Henry's movements are taken from 
this source, but for the dates my preference lies with the Privy 
Purse account in Excerpta Historia, p85, and John Stowe's account 
op cit., p476. The names are from the Chronicle, those in 
brackets are alternative spellings from the Privy Purse or Stowe.
3. The Privy Purse account disagrees with this time scale. It puts
the army at Brytenvyle on 17 October and at a village called 
Wimelle half a mile from Boulogne on 18 October. Excerpta 
Historia, p91. Stowe agrees with the Chronicle, stating that 
after the night at Wimelle the next night was spent outside 
Boulogne, Annales, p476. There is a small French town of
Willmille only four miles from Boulogne and would appear to be the 
town the army occupied on 17 October.
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for the English. Firstly, the town was 'a very strong place, contrary 
to all expectations’ as Henry informed the Pope later on.^ If the 
memorial from the captains was not prewritten then they too were 
surprised by the strength of the town. These captains, including the 
earls of Dorset, Oxford, Shrewsbury, Kent, Essex and Devon, stated that 
Boulogne was only supposed to be feebly defended and should have been
9taken ’within three or four daies at farthest’, In spite of this as
3 Henry’s intention had been known ’by the space of yer holle and moore’ 
the town had been heavily fortified. The depth of fortification was 
surprising. Boulogne was reported to have ’doble minaylys,
countermines, Castellis, Towns Bulwerkis, dry Deches and watred’,^ well 
provisioned and garrisoned with large numbers of ’gunners, gunpowdre 
with shot for the same, with all maner of Artillerie, Capitainyas, and 
men of Warre, the best of Fraunce furnysshed and preparid’.^ An 
undoubted bastion and one which would have proved difficult to take, to 
such an extent that the English declared it ’one of the strongest Townes 
of Picardie’.G Despite the impressive nature of Boulogne’s defences it 
was daily assaulted by the siege train, yet Hall states this only 
’defaced the Walles’ and no breaches are recorded.
If all the rules and regulations Henry ordered in his Ordinances 
were adhered to, life in the English camp was probably dull during the 
siege. The men’s only encouragement was the prospect of booty when the 
town fell, although it could not have been accomplished without ’greater 
damage to the realm of England’.^ Feelings in the English camp probably 
NOTES
1. Calendar of the State Papers and Manuscripts Venetian; 1202-1509, 
ed., Rawden Brown, G. Cavendish Bentinck and Horatio F. Brown 
Vol.l, p214.







changed dramatically to those of surprise, shock and anger when the 
rumours of peace spread. This rumour had been rife before Henry left 
England and the memorial of 1 November added substance. When peace was 
declared the anger and sense of loss became volatile. Hall describes 
the men in ’great fumes, angry, and evil content, rayling and murmurings 
amongst themselfes* while many claimed Henry had sought peace through 
fear. The nobles were also greatly aggrieved, hoping to win their 
spurs; many had borrowed large sums of money and ’sore grudged and 
lamented this sodeyne peace’.^
The Treaty Henry agreed to is well known. The Treaty of Etaples 
gave Henry 745,000 gold crowns at the rate of 52,000 crowns a year. 
According to the Privy Purse the peace was cried on Sunday 4 November. 
Stowe and the Chronicle of Calais state that the siege continued until 8 
November. The Lord Mayor of London received news of the Peace Treaty on 
9 November announcing it to the aidermen in the Guildhall on the same
2day. It is possible the document was signed on 3 November, the 
generally accepted date, but was not announced to the whole army until 4 
November. It then took until 8 November for all operations to cease and 
troops to be removed from the vicinity of Boulogne.
Henry viewed the expedition as a success. There had not been a 
major English victory, but neither had there been a great loss of life. 
The only recorded casualty was Sir John Savage and that was through his 
own stupidity, or bravery. During a daily ride inspecting the defences, 
he and Sir John Risely rode too close to the town and were ambushed. 









refused to surrender although heavily outnumbered. He fought to his 
death, his action though, created a diversion sufficient for Risely to 
get away ’on a most speedy horse’.Another knight killed was Sir 
Thomas Milbone in uncertain circumstances. It was early on in the 
campaign. The wages of his retinue, a demilancer and twenty-four
9archers’ were all paid to the demilancer from 12 October until 7 
December. Other losses appear only minimal, no more than twenty, 
judging from reductions in the wages bills in Cope’s account.
Henry could claim to have been more successful than Edward IV. He 
had invaded France during the worst part of the campaigning season, 
whereas Edward went during the height of summer. Henry captured four 
towns, including Ardes and Mountorye, Edward none. Henry marched twenty 
miles into French territory and ’made daily war against the French’^ all 
without allies. Edward was supported by the Dukes of Burgundy and 
Britanny and the towns of Picardy as far as the Somme. More remarkably 
Henry achieved this in only twenty-four days, Edward had taken fifty- 
six.
These were the successes Henry claimed. He could not claim 
achievement in his main goal, the relief of Britanny. He had failed 
there, even before he had begun. What had been at stake was firstly 
English pride and secondly, perhaps more importantly, his own position.
NOTES
1• Anglica Historia, p59
2. E36/285, f32. These were considerably less than he had promised. 
In his Indenture, E101/72/3 no. 21 he promised 1 spear, 1 
demilancer, 305 archers and 60 others.
3. E36/285, These were 1 spear, 3 demilancers, 2 Yeomen and 14 
Archers. The bulk of the losses were 13 archers from Poynings’ 
force after they arrived. Evidently his experienced troops took 
the brunt of any action.
4. Foedera, XII, p4691.
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The first was not fully satisfied. English troops had not been put to 
the test, much to their personal annoyance. With the latter Henry did 
have some success. As part of the Treaty of Etaples, Charles VIII 
accepted Henry as King of England and promised not to give any 
assistance to foreign pretenders, a reference to Perkin Warbeck. This 
in itself was a significant coup for the House of Tudor.
Henry did not return to England as quickly as one would have 
expected. He was back in Calais 7 November, according to the Privy 
Purse, or 12 November if one prefers the Chronicle of Calais. On 10 
November he made a short trip to Genes (Guiñes) and returned on 11 
November. Probably this visit was for a final meeting with Philippe des 
Querdes; who, following the English withdrawal, had moved north from 
Etaples.*
9Henry returned to England 17 December, although the Chronicle of 
Calais states 27 November, and Vergil and Hall put it as late as early 
1493. The letter from the King to the Pope dated 12 December 1492 was 
written at Calais and exposes the date in the Chronicle of Calais. John 
Shirley was back in London 13 December buying £60 of food for the 
'King’s diette’,3 Other of the ’King's Stuffe' was freighted back to 
England from 16 December and we can assume Henry left near that time. 
Henry was certainly in London before Christmas, according to Fabyan and 
the Chronicle of London. On Saturday 22 December Henry rode into London 
in triumph accompanied by the Mayor and Aidermen. They had met the
NOTES
1. Further evidence for this is found in Cope. 10 November John 
Shirley, Clerk of the King's kitchen, a person not likely to be 
far from the King, bought £20 of food for the 'King's diette' in 
Calais. E36/285, f57.




King at Blackheath and, dressed in scarlet, these officials had led him 
through streets of rapturous crowds of commoners, dressed in violet, to 
the thanksgiving service at St. Paul's. An obviously stage-managed 
event, with which Henry, no doubt, was delighted.
Only the repassage of his army remained. This appears to have 
been carried out without mishap, considering the season. The main body 
was back in England and paid off by the middle of December 1492. The 
problem of numbers meant some did not return until January 1493. Henry 
by then had moved to Greenwich, there no doubt, he pondered over the 
terms of the treaty and how he was to get Parliament to ratify it.
The expedition of 1492 was not one that would be used to inspire 
the hearts of Englishmen in the future, such as those of Crecy and 
Agincourt could do. Despite this, it was not a failure. Henry had his 
pension from the King of France, and he made a profit from his expenses. 
Henry could be well satisfied, he was secure in his position; in fact he 
had made it appear even more secure, with the knowledge of Charles' 
recognition and that Perkin Warbeck was no longer welcome. We must not 
underestimate Warbeck's threat in 1492; on the basis of later events, it 
was very real in that year and had events progressed differently, Henry 
could have faced a more serious invasion and rebellion of his own much 
sooner than he did
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES INVOLVED IN 1492
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Analysts of English invasion armies of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries are fortunate in the quality of available 
information. The armies of 1417 and 1475 are fully documented. For 
1492 we are not so fortunate. The ravages of time have left only 
fragments. Changes in accounting procedures meant the Tellers' Rolls 
were not used as in previous reigns. In 1492, although the tellers 
themselves were used, all accounting went through the office of the 
Treasurer for War, Reynold Bray, but were documented by his deputy 
William Cope.l Unfortunately, incomplete as this source is, we are 
forced to make several assumptions with regard to the actual size of 
Henry's army: I will attempt to show how such assumptions can be made.
Cope accounts for the wages and travelling expenses of 117 
retinue captains, 1218 men-at-arms and 6658 archers. These figures 
we can supplement with the account of William Hatcliffe, a teller, 
whose payments would eventually have been included in Cope and may 
indeed be contained within the missing gathering. Hatcliffe was 
responsible, together with many other tellers, for the actual 
payments, yet his account is the only known survivor. With a little 
duplication he accounts for a further 18 previously unaccounted 
retinue captains, 33 men-at-arms and 502 archers. This amounts to a 
total of 135 retinue captains, 1251 men-at-arms and 7160 archers, 
considerable though it was, but well short of the various estimates 
made for Henry's army. These have varied from 12,680 troops including 
3200 horse^ to 26000 troops.
NOTES
1. E36/285.
2. Ibid., fl8-50 ending abruptly in the account of William
Middleton.
3. E36/208.
M. Van Cleeve Alexander, The First of the Tudors (1981), pl02.
5« P.B. Wernham, Before the Armada (1966), p36; J.A. Williams,
The Tudor Age (1979), p35.
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Vergil and Hall state Henry 'assembled an enormous army',^ but 
what was meant by 'enormous'? Was it 12,000 or 26,000? Examination 
of typical Hundred Years War forces which fought at Crecy, Poitier and 
Agincourt, and Edward IV's army of 1475, results in considerable 
variation, 15,000, 6000, 10000 and 12000 respectively; only two were 
classified as 'enormous'; Edward Ill's at Crecy and Edward IV's of 
1475. Assuming Vergil had information concerning the size of earlier 
invasion armies, especially that of 1475, he might have used these for 
comparison. Consequently, Cope and Hatcliffe's wages bills for 8411 
troops seems inadequate and only the missing gathering can give the 
full answer.
Powicke, in his description of armies of the Lancastrian 
, 9period of the Hundred Years War, relies heavily upon Indentures and 
Warrants of Issue, both extensive in their content and preserved in 
large numbers. For Henry VII, Warrants of Issue were not used and the 
Indentures have either been lost in significant number or were not 
completed during their issue in June, due to the change in
. 3circumstances. The possible explanation for the latter is
NOTES
1» Anglica Historia, p56.
2. M.R. Powicke, 'Lancastrian Captains' in Essays in Medieval
History presented to B. Wilkinson, (Toronto 1969), p371-382.
3« E101/72/3, 4, 5 and 6. There are only 78 completed indentures
whereas up to 230 retinue captains could have been present. 
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connected with the failure of Maximilian to come up to expectations. 
The intended invasion was for June, but this became clearly impossible 
in May, so Henry ceased making contracts until new plans had been 
made. New contracts were never completed. The Indentures were still 
important, they help fill many gaps left by Cope’s Accounts. Of the 
86 Indentures, only 78 are relevant.Examination provides an 
Indentured force of 4449 troops comprised of 1053 men-at-arms and 3396 
archers or others. Evidently Henry was only half way through raising 
the force of 10,000 archers he had persuaded Parliament to finance.
By cross referencing the indentured captains with Cope’s 
accounts we can trace 43 who were paid wages. I do not doubt that the 
remaining 35 attended and we must presume so, they would not dare, or 
even wish to flout the King’s wishes and break a promise. Closer 
examination of the 43 reveals, in most cases, the captains increased 
their promises in line with the King’s demands for a larger force, 
necessary since Maximilian's failure to uphold his side of the 
agreement. On average this increase was 1% for men-at-arms and 17% 
for archers. Assuming that all the indentured retinues attended, the 
35 unrecorded retinues should also be assigned a similar percentage 
increase. This group provided 348 men-at-arms and 901 archers 
increasing, with our assumption to 352 and 1054
NOTES
1. Ibid. The remaining eight have duplicates, presumably the
results of failed contract attempts, each contains simply the 
name of the captain, three additionally contain excuses, on 
the reverse, for none attendance.
respectively. Adding these troops to Cope’s total and Hatcliffe’s, 
the army would have totalled 9817 troops, still somewhat short of an 
'enormous army’.
Thus our first assumption has been that the missing gatherings 
of 32 pages contained only 35 indentured captains; many of whom we do 
know attended from other sources.1 It is evident that 35 retinues 
would not fill 32 pages in Cope’s accounts and so more must have 
attended. Other evidence is necessary to continue the investigation.
Hatcliffe’s account lists many payments made during the 
campaign; payments for mercenaries, wages and travel expenses and most 
significantly lists of retinues shipped on the repassage. Numbers of 
the retinues are not included, but the retinue captain was named. 
Some of these confirm the presence of indentured retinues, which were 
otherwise unrecorded; most refer to retinues mentioned in Cope, yet a 
further twenty-nine retinues listed are new. Most notable amongst 
these are seven lords; four examples being John de Vere, Earl of 
Oxford, Edmund Dudley, Lord Dudley, Edmund de la Pole, Earl of 
Suffolk, and the retinue of the Earl of Northumberland^
Signatures to the memorial of November 1492 indicate three 
further retinues, while additional references in Cope
NOTES
1. Lords Latimer, Powis & Audley, Sir Reynold Bray and Sir Hugh
Conway were present identified through their signatures on the 
memorial 1 November 1492.
2. Such as Lords Latimer and Powis, Sir Reynold Bray, Sir John 
Crocker, Robert Belingham and Henry Mountford.
3. The other three were: John, Lord Zouche, the Lord of Clunne 
and a Lord Curtod?
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suggest another two.1 A sixth is inferred by Sir William Paston’s 
9letter to Sir John Paston 18 February 1492 and a seventh through the 
action of Sir George de Vere, John de Vere’s brother, and his 
subsequent death at the Siege of Sluys. These references allow for a 
further thirty-six retinue captains in total who, attributing to them 
the average retinue,could have led up to 2199 troops.
To further assist us in our assumption there is a document 
which purports to be a list of the King’s Army into France. This is 
folio 43 of the Burton Abbey Register.5 It commences with the 
statement 'The King's retinue into France whereof the fourth part to 
be on horseback, and the other to be on foot at his wage'. Although 
not dated it is assumed to date from 1492^ and it details an army of 
12,660 men including seven earls, 12 barons, and 64 knights. Closer 
examination shows that of the 107 individual retinues itemized some 
six lords and 30 knights and gentlemen are new names not found in any 
of the other sources. However, the register also fails to mention ten 
lords and numerous other retinues known to have participated through 
Cope, Ratcliffe or the Indentures. Therefore this is not the 
definitive list as are none of the sources. More significantly, when 
the numbers of troops each retinue comprised are compared with both 
the Wages and Indenture lists they hardly compare. Of 107 entries 
only eight show a less than 20% discrepancy with the Wages or
NOTES
1. E30/612. There is a probable total of eighty-one names in
all, but the signatures are badly galled and sometimes 
illegible making naming impossible. Three are clearer than 
most of those not previously mentioned; Sir John Carew, Sir 
John Barnard and John Jones.
2. E36/285, f75. Sir John Metonham and John Rayneford Esquire, 
Captains.
3. The Paston Letters Vol.vi, pl43. 5. Hall op.cit. p452.
4. The average retinue based upon retinues in Cope and Hatcliffe 
was nine men-at-arms and fifty-two archers.
5. Nottingham University. Middleton MSS Mi De7, f43.
6. A. Cameron, 'The Giving of Livery and Retaining in Henry VII's
reign'. Renaissance and Modern Studies, vol.18 1974, p23.
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Indentures and only one, John Halwell's retinue, is exactly the same 
on all three.1 The question arises what is this document and does it 
bear any relation to 1492? The evidence does point to 1492, but when 
in that year was it drawn up? The mention of a quarter of the total 
force being mounted dates it to about the time of the Indentures which 
also mention mounted archers, other sources make no mention of such 
troops. In my opinion, this list is similar to lists ordered drawn up 
by sheriffs and other local officials to indicate a county’s readiness 
to aid the King. In this instance this was a preliminary list showing 
the country’s ability to raise an army of invasion.
Considering over 66% of the retinues mentioned are known to 
have attended, can we safely assume the remaining 34% or 36 retinues 
did so? These would add a further 217 men-at-arms and 1638 archers. 
What makes me doubt this document is no more than a preliminary survey 
is that the list total shows 12660 men, but adding the retinues 
together they only amount to 7586. There is no indication where the 
extra 5000 were to come from. I have my reservations as to whether 
the details of this document should be included in my calculation. It 
will only be included in the total in parenthesis. Given that of the 
107 retinues on the list 42 were paid wages, 15 sent less while 27 
sent more than the list indicated, I will also attribute the same 
percentage increase given to the Indentures. That is 1% and 17% 
respectively men-at-arms and archers. Thus a further 219 men-at-arms 
and 1916 archers can be added to the grand total.
Altogether, seventy-one extra [107] retinues can be
NOTES
1. Two men-at-arms and forty archers.
2. Including the extra 36 Burton Abbey Register retinues.
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identified and could have led up to 3605 [5150] troops. Adding these 
to known figures we have a force of 206 [242] retinue captains (135) 
known through wages and 71 [107] deduced through other references),
1,930 [2149] men-at-arms, and 10,086 [12,002] archers a total of 12016 
[14,151] troops to which should be added technical personnel, 
attendants (custrells and pages for knights and senior men-at-arms), 
secretaries and royal servants; a grand total of 14,504 [16,886].
This is more like the ’enormous army* the sources talk of; one to 
compare with the armies of Crecy and Edward IV in 1475. Calculations 
based on the wages will confirm this; the wages bill can be calculated 
for a total of 12,278 troops.
Alternative to the above calculations for the probable size of 
the army, the size of fleet can be examined and the army calculated 
from fleet numbers. Crown agents for the collection of the fleet had
9been dispatched in February 1492, with further agents dispatched in 
May to increase its’ size with the changed plans. Generally the fleet 
was gathered from ports and coastal towns along the South and East 
coast, though some did come from Bristol and Ilfracombe and other 
Western ports. The majority of these vessels would have been small 
coastal barques. Ketches and a few larger caravels and cogs were also 
available, but even so these were not sufficient to carry the large 
numbers of men and equipment during a quick crossing. Consequently 
Dutch ships were also engaged, especially 'hoyes, cogships and 
plaits.Most, like the hoyes, were presumably rigged as sloops and
NOTES






adapted to carrying passengers on short sea journeys along coastal 
routes. These would have been ideal for the channel crossing between 
Sandwich and Calais
Altogether 300 English ships and 335 Dutch vessels were 
employed for the crossing. The Dutch were only engaged for fifteen 
days and their role was, presumably, solely for assisting in the 
initial landing. Henry would have been wisely advised to land as many 
men as quickly as possible, the return journey could have been carried 
out more leisurely, safe behind the defences of Calais. English ship 
contracts varied between two and four months, similar to those of the 
English troops, some of each were still in service in France during 
1493, two months after the peace treaty had been signed.
It is difficult to determine how many troops this fleet could 
have carried in one single crossing. Two references indicate possible 
carriage capacity. Hatcliffe indicates a variable carriage capacity 
of between 38 and 230 for ships carrying troops to the siege of 
Sluys.l A second fragment of a document referring to ships watching
9 the sea gives a variation of between 80 and 290. The importance of 
both these pieces of evidence is that in addition they refer to the 
cost of carrying these numbers. Cope does not mention the carriage 
capacity of any of the vessels he lists, yet he does list individual 
payments. Correlation of the hire charges in Hatcliffe and the 




2. E36/15, Account of Military Stores and Payments to soldiers 
and marines on board 5 ships, fragment. Between 11 May and 7 
June 1492 five ships were hired and crewed presumably to watch 
the sea for French activities during preparations for the 
invasion.
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in the following table.
Wages No.of English Ships 
hired through Cope.
Possible carriage 
capacity of each ship.
a) Under £5 a month 245 Under 75 troops
b) £5-£10 a month 46 75-150 troops
c) £10-£20 a month 6 150-300 troops
d) Over £20 a month 3 300-500 troops maximum^
The Dutch fleet was paid £3760 12s.8d. for fifteen days
service or an average of £11 each or £22 per month. Assuming they
were not paid at any higher rates as they were mercenaries, their
carriage capacity falls in group c, but most likely it varied between
a and b.
Not all these ships would carry troops. Even given the 
necessity of landing as many troops in one instance as possible, a 
percentage would have been needed for other important purposes. 
Horses, wagons, ordnance, victuals, munitions, beer and wine all had 
to be transported across the channel to ensure no imbalance in any 
department occurred.
Another factor that must be considered was the protection of 
the fleet. Was it to be heavily or only superficially protected 
during the crossings? A certain proportion of the fleet would 
certainly have been detached for protection duties. Henry had in fact 
been sending out ships for such duties all through the summer, but 
whether these patrols were greatly increased during the crossing is 
almost impossible to ascertain. What size were these ships? To use 
the largest would result in a decrease in carriage capacity, whilst 
the use of smaller ships reduced the protective value. In all
NOTES
1. These figures assume an average crew on board each ship of
ten, fifteen, twenty and at least fifty for the respective 
categories. The maximum is calculated from a payment for 
'victuals’ for 1000 men on board the two largest ships in 
English waters, the Regent and the Sovereign. E36/285, f77. 
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probability the vessels used would simply have been those most readily 
available. As previously calculated, there were 635 vessels 
available. Therefore if we assign a relatively high proportion of
say 50% to protective and other duties, the remaining 317 vessels 
would be left for carrying troops. The possible carriage capacity of 
such a fleet could have varied from anywhere between 16000 to as high 
as 45000. This is an impossible method of calculating the army's 
size, yet it does suggest the exceptional organisation that must have 
gone into the preparation of gathering such a fleet, and points to its 
tremendous potential.
The army was clearly large by whatever calculations we use. 
Of greater value is its efficiency and I turn my attention to that 
problem.
The method of assessment must surely be that which both 
Powicke and Lander use in their analyses of the armies of Henry V and 
Edward IV respectively.Powicke maintains that at the height of 
English success the most desirable ratio of archers to men-at-arms was 
three to one, but after 1415 the contingents raised declined in 
quality with the ratio rising to four to one for the greater nobles 
and to as high as fourteen to one for others. Many companies became 
little more than bands of archers. Lander has shown that this decline 
continued into Edward IV's army with some ratios as high as ten to
3 one, the army as a whole being seven to one.
Obviously it is difficult to make such an assessment of the 
army of 1492 given so many missing details. Yet, examination of those
NOTES
1. M.R. Powicke, op.cit.; J.R. Lander, Crown and Nobility (1976),
pp223-241. ------ ------------------
2. Powicke, op.cit. pp380-382.
3. J.R. Lander, up.cit. p239.
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available reveals some interesting facts. The Indentures for 1492, 
giving total of 1053 men-at-arms and 3396 archers, indicate the ratio 
of three to one; the very ratio Powicke states was desirable.
For Henry V this was achieved with all retinue captains from the 
9’Greater Companies’’ down to the lower companies complying with the 
ratio. This was not the case in 1492. On closer analysis of Henry 
VII’s captains we do not find such compliance with this ratio. 
Henry’s captains retinues varied from pure archer bands to even some 
pure men-at-arms groups.
What these figures for 1492 do show are the many privately 
maintained armies that existed. On the other hand it was impractical 
for the King to keep such large numbers of soldiers continually in his 
pay. The royal yeomanry had been established in 1485, but was very 
small, styled on the French model seen while Henry was in exile. 
This group was led by Sir Charles Somerset in 1492 and even this did 
not subscribe to the desirable ratio. It amounted to eight 
demilancers, 157 yeomen at 12d a day, four yeomen at 8d and 101 
archers at 6d.^ Even by the end of Henry’s reign it had not been 
increased to more than 500 strong.
On close examination of the ratio identified by the wage 
accounts we find 1258 men-at-arms were present with 7160 archers, a 
ratio of almost six to one, not as great as that of 1475, but still
NOTES
1. Powicke, op.cit.,pp371-373
2. That is a retinue of more than 20 men-at-arms. For a more 
detailed account of these figures see pp77-89 below.
3. J.R. Hooker, Notes on The Organisation and Supply of The Tudor 
Military under Henry VII, Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 
vol.23, 1959 pl9.
4. E36/285, f23-24.
5. A. Cameron, op.cit., pl8 n 4. This bodyguard must have seen 
some action as it incurred losses of 2 demilancers, one 
yeoman, one archer sergeant and one archer. 
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well above the desirable ratio. Looking for 'Greater Companies' we 
find less than had been promised. Many of the indentured great 
captains had problems in raising the 20 men-at-arms.
Despite these problems it has been suggested that this force 
was the largest that invaded France during the fifteenth century, yet 
it was never fully put to the test. It had more success than Edward 
IV's had, but like Edward IV, Henry did not face a French field army. 
Like Professor Lander, I do not feel we should be dogmatic about its 
success and efficiency. With a ratio of more than five archers to 
every man-at-arms overall, the probabilities would also 'seem to lie 
strongly against military distinction'. Most of the soldiers had far 
less experience than those of Henry V, there was no training, no 
government could sustain the charges nor would it have been wise to 
encourage the existence of large numbers of armed men. Large 
privately owned armies frightened Henry VII on more than one occasion, 
even when they were kept by such supporters as John de Vere, Earl of 
Oxford. Having to therefore fall back on the military indenture 
system left Henry VII with an army resembling a feudal levy 
corresponding little to the armies developing in France and Italy.
Of course, Henry had invaded late in the season and expected, 
and hoped, not to have to face the French army. It has been hinted at 
previously that it is believed he knew this, given that peace
NOTES 
1.. See below p84-99.
2. Henry entered 20 miles of French territory and sacked a number 
of fortresses and two French towns; Ardes and Mountorye, 
E36/612.
3. Lander, op.cit.,p239.
4. J.R. Hooker, op.cit., pl9.
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negotiations were possibly under way with Des Querdes before Henry 
even left England. Presumably he hoped the expedition would only need 
to be a short one with a gallant return home and action restricted to 
a few sieges. This premise is supported by numerous references to 
quantities of ordnance being moved to the coast and shipped to Calais 
from as early as February 1492,1 to 8 September 1492 when William 
Fournesse and John Jernes of Southampton were engaged for this 
purpose.The type of ordnance is not clear, only once was anything 
specifically referred to; Robert Baynebridge was paid 20s. for 
’carriage of a shot of Irene for bumberdelles and curtowes and other
3gunnes for the town of Cales and Boleign for the siege there.'
Henry intended to use more cannon and other firearms. 
Poynings' force sent to Sluys reveals this fact. It was equipped with 
the following list of supplies for a force of 2500 men:-
'5300 demi wade (wadding for cannons)
1300 half 100 lbs of gunpowder
700 demi loade (charge for firearms)
1300 demi tampoons, (discs or cylinders of wood to
fill the bore of muzzle loading 
guns, rammed between the charge and 
the missile.)
plate and bolte (missiles)
lanterns
Tallows (tallow candles used for igniting charges in 
cannons)'
NOTES
1. The Paston Letters, vol.VI, pl43.
2. E36/285, f54.
3. E36/285, f55. Bumbardelles were small bombards, curtowes were 
short bombards like mortars, Irene - iron shot.
4. E36/285, f58.
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These are significant amounts for only 2500 men who were 
presumably mostly archers. Hatcliffe reinforces this use of 
artillery. He accounts for numbers of mercenaries hired during the 
siege of Sluys, significant among them were 200 individuals as 
gunners. These were accounted for under twelve individuals of obvious 
German, Flemish or Dutch origin, such as Henry Von Howe or Stephano 
Stump, Captain of Flemish troops, but more significantly according to 
their pay they are identifiable as cannon crews. Of the twelve 
entries, eight are identical in that the master gunner was paid 12d. a 
day, two others at 10d., six at 8d. and seven at 6d. Presumably this 
identifies at least one, or more probably, two ordnance pieces per 
entry. 1 Whether these men were additionally used at the siege of 
Boulogne is not revealed.
Sufficient gunpowder was another problem and stores kept at 
the Tower were inadequate in 1492. Large amounts had to be made or 
bought. Thomas Overey, one of the tellers, paid Thomas Franconer £100
, 9at one time and £50 at another for making gunpowder in Southampton. 
There were considerable quantities, as confirmed by examining a second 
reference. Thomas Overey also paid for ’dives stuff of ordernances' 
amongst which he paid £53.12s.l0d. for 30 carts of gunpowder. 
Presumably Overey paid equal sums for equal amounts, he had bought 120 
carts of gunpowder or the equivalent of 487,500 lbs of gunpowder, 





4. See page 50, note 3. in the Chapter on Supply for how this 
equation is calculated.
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Originally, Henry had intended his force to amount to the 
equivalent of 10,000 archers (assuming some men-at-arms were included 
in this figure); this, however, depended upon Maximilian's support. 
Without this Henry found he had no choice but to go alone, but with an 
increased force. Many writers lead us to believe that this force was 
over 25,000 men and the fleet numbers do not rule out the possibility 
of such a figure. However, I do not believe this possible, given the 
logistics of the time or the support of Henry's captains. Yet, the 
King did increase his army by up to 50% to a maximum of 15000 troops 
(rounding up the totals as shown in Appendix C). To transport this 
force, a fleet of 635 English and Dutch vessels of varying quality was 
gathered from English and Dutch towns like Antwerp and Amsterdam. The 
artillery train was clearly impressive, perhaps the largest that had 
crossed the channel, or was to cross it for many years to come. 
Nevertheless, this train was unable to destroy the defences of 
Boulogne, although daily it 'rased and defaced the Wallis.'^ This 
was not surprising as Boulogne had been strongly fortified in 
anticipation, so much so that it had become 'oon of the strongest 
townes of Picardy.'2 Artillery of Henry VII's period was still not 
sufficient to destroy a heavily fortified town; yet it had proved 
efficient enough to aid the capture of Sluys and smaller French 
fortresses and towns like Ardes and Mounteroys. Despite these
successes this army did not face the French on the field of battle. 
The French, rejuvenated since Joan of Arc, were experienced in 
continental warfare against the Empire and Spain by 1492, to the 
extent that the English were now novices. It is very uncertain
whether an English army would have fared well and doubtful it would 






SUPPLY FOR THE ARMY
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'An army marches on its stomach', but food was not the only 
problem of supplies. The requirements for fifteenth century 
campaigns, like others, were almost endless.
Stocks of certain requirements; longbows, arrows and 
artillery, were maintained in the Tower. Extensive as these were, 
they were insufficient for prolonged campaigns and between November 
1491 and November 1492 Henry issued commissions for the manufacture of 
such equipment and its delivery to either the Tower or to his person 
in France.^ The bow was still the main weapon of English troops, 
supplemented by the stake for personal protection against mounted 
attacks. Evidence in 1492 for the 'bills' as either a separate weapon 
group within the English army, or as an additional weapon for archers, 
is inconclusive. The indentures suggest a small number of troops 
either attended with bills or were double armed with bills and bows, 
but in the wage accounts neither type were indicated. There was only 
one request for the manufacture of bills, but no record of any
9specific payment. There was, however, only one similar contract for 
the manufacture of arrows in the same period, but this is not 
conclusive proof. Additionally, only one payment for supply refers 
to bowstaves.
Many supply payments made by Cope were simply for 'Ordnance 
and sundry charges' making it difficult to evaluate accurate
NOTES
1. As shown by several commissions; William Lovell for 
manufacturing arrows. C.P.R. 1485-92, p258. William Austen 
for manufacturing bows. Ibid., p392.
2. Ibid, p392, to John Russell.
3. Ibid, p392, to Gilbert Foreman.
4. E36/285, f76. £3467.14s.lid. paid to John Dawtry for
bowstaves, Saltpeter, Malmsey and other charges.
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quantities of supplies of bowstaves, arrows and more especially of 
bills. £6653.11s.4a.1 was made in global payments. Speculation as to 
quanti tips presumably contained within these global amounts can lead 
to estimates of large numbers of bowstaves, bowstrings, arrows and 
possibly bills being purchased. These items were inexpensive; 
bowstaves cost 20d. each and a sheaf of arrows 16d., while a bill cost 
only one shilling. Consequently it appears strange that large
purchases of such items were not individually accounted; 10,000 
bowstaves would have cost £833.6s.8d., 20,000 sheaves of arrows
£1333.6s.8d. and 2000-5000 bills between £100 and £250.
Although the quantity of bows and bills was indefinite, the 
quantity of gunpowder and other artillery accessories was more clearly 
accounted for. On three occasions Thomas Overey bought gunpowder, 
twice from Thomas Franconer in Southampton. £203.12s.lOd. was spent 
on gunpowder and, assuming equal amounts were paid for equal 
quantities, this amounts to 9750 barrels, alternatively 487,500 lbs. 
of gunpowder, a significant quantity, but not all that would have been 
required for a prolonged campaign.
Artillery needed more than just gunpowder. Other purchases 
were unaccounted for, yet we do gain one insight into the 
requirements. William Comersault was charged with equipping twelve 
NOTES
1. E36/285, f76. £251.10s.6d. for Ordnance to Richard Butler,
teller of the receipt of the King’s exchequer. £3467.14s.lid. 
for bowstaves, Saltpeter, Malmsey and other charges to the 
Merchants of the Staple. £674.6s.8d. to Richard Guildford, 
Master of the King’s Ordnance.
2. E36/285, f60. In the year 1492-3 Lord Overey paid £30.3s.4d. 
for 120 bows, 280 sheaves of arrows and bow strings for a 
ship’s company bound for Ireland on board The Barke of 
St.Ives. Additionally he paid 12d. each for six dozen bills, 
suggesting over half the archers could have been equipped with 
a bill as well as their bow.
3. E36/285, f73. In one purchase of £53.12s.l0d. he bought 30 
cartloads of gunpowder. f58 indicates the cost of a barrel of 
gunpowder at 5d. for one 501b. barrel. On this basis a cart 
could carry 85 barrels amounting to 9750 barrels in total, or 
487,500 lbs. of gunpowder.
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ships and troops sent to the siege of Sluys.1 Equipping the force 
with food and gunpowder the list also includes ’5300 demiwade, 700 
demiloads, 1300 demi tampoons, plate and bolte, lanterns and tallows.’ 
This suggests that amongst Poynings’ force some men were equipped with 
arqubuses for which the ’plate and bolte’ were the projectiles. Yet, 
when Poynings’ force was paid on arrival at Boulogne none of his 
retinue was specifically referred to as anything other than men-at- 
arms and archers.^
We are compensated for these inadequacies by the references to 
other supplies, especially food. The problems of food supply had been 
analysed in detail and the initial contract, predating all indentures 
for troops, was for the supply of victuals for the army. Everard 
Newchurch, a pewter of London, signed contracts with the King for the 
provision of small, but significant quantities of victuals on 25 
February 1492. He was to supply three pipes of wheatflour, fifteen 
pipes of beer, and one pipe of beef. More significant than the 
quantities, are the details of the contract and the conditions both 
parties agreed to. Newchurch was to take the victuals to Portsmouth 
by 20 May, incurring all the risks and financial burdens in the 
channel crossing until the supplies arrived in France. Here, he then 
had the opportunity of recouping his outlay and realising a profit. 
On arrival in France, at the King’s camp, Newchurch could set ’such
NOTES
1. E36/285, f58. Comersault was clerk of the King's ships.
2. One possible explanation is that these munitions were for the 
ships’ armament, but for what would have been twelve poorly 
armed merchant ships this quantity does seem excessive.
3. E101/72/3 No.l.
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resonnable prises....upon his vitaill....as the said Everard shal wele 
live and be right wele content and plesed.'l These were, moreover, 
couched in strict terms. Newchurch was not allowed to sell 
independently in France and had to make the deadline and places set by 
the Provost Marshal of the Army. The food had to be '...good and 
suffissaunt and holsom for mannes body', the penalties if it were 
not were extreme. Should any conditions be broken Newchurch forfeited 
double the value of the promised commodities and surrendered himself 
'at the King's wille.' Failure to meet such a fine was covered 
through forfeiture of all he owned 'body, lande and goode and to be at 
his (the King's) yeste disposición and wille.All possible 
circumstances, such as the ship's capture during the channel crossing, 
were covered in the agreement. If anything happened outside 
Newchurch's control, the King agreed to cover half the cost of any 
lost supplies. Finally, Newchurch agreed to pay all shipping costs 
across the channel and to the army's forward base. An apparently one 
sided contract. This was not so in reality. Upon arrival in France, 
Newchurch would be 'poynted and lymeted a place'"’ to store his goods 
safely until the provost marshal informed him where to take them. The 
journey to the forward camp would be under guard, protecting Newchurch 
and his goods from 'jeopode of enemys at al tymes.'^ Once in the camp 
Newchurch would be well treated, given a favourable position to sell 
his goods and allowed to make a reasonable profit. Here he would have 
competed with other royally approved victuallers set up like market 









Other conditions in the contract benefited Newchurch enabling 
him to make a handsome profit. Certain passages were directed towards 
royal officials in England, especially those at the ports. These 
commanded all the King’s ’Officers ministers and subgiettes as shriefs 
Maires Stewarde Constables'1- to give Newchurch as much help as 
possible in collecting and shipping the supplies in England. 
Moreover, once at the port, this instruction was extended to the 
'comptrollers serchers kept of porte' to allow quick and uninterrupted 
passage through customs ’without paying to (the King)., or any oyer
9 for us any mener customer or charges.' Henry required a great deal 
from his subjects, but was wise enough to dispense with the normal red 
tape to encourage their help.
Only three indentures of supply have survived. The other two 
were with William Attkyn, John Prowde, John Lappe, Haberdashers of 
London and John Worme of Calais.These agreed to supply quantities 
of Malmsey, bacon, oats, cheese, beans and salt. Others were 
commissioned to supply food varying from wheat, beer and fish, yet no 




3. E101/72/3, No.5. E101/72/6, No.18. The Haberdashers signed
on 16 March while John Worme signed much later on 12 August. 
The three contracts amounted to 5 pipes and 3 lasts of Wheat 
flour
41 pipes of beer,
13 pipes of beef,
3 buttes of Malmsey
10 flitches of bacon,
30 quarters of oats,
14 weyes of cheese,
2 quarters of beans,
4 barrels of salt.
4. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol.l, p415. The commissions were issued to 
John Taillow, Nicholas Dyker, John Matheu, John Hamond and 
Thomas Freyer. The goods to be supplied were: Wheat, beans, 
peas, oats, beer, flesh, salted and fresh fish, cheese, butter 
and other victuals.
55
£13,431.15s. was spent on victuals during the campaign, a 
further £488.Id. on shipping supplies, mainly wine from England to 
Calais.^ Purchases of victuals varied from oxen, beef, multons 
(sheep for eating), hoggesflesh, fish, wheat or bread and large 
quantities of beer. This last item necessitated the building of a 
special brewery and purchases of 569 tonnes and 64 pipes of beer. 
Other purchases included spices and biscuits, but the major portion of 
the £13000 accounted for unspecified quantities of victuals; 
£9192.7s.Id. between five suppliers.
Supply was one major problem and another was transport. No 
fewer than ninety-one carts were purchased, with other references 
indicating the collection of larger quantities of carts, carters, 
’chariot’ and draught horses, ’sumpter’ (pack or baggage) horses, 
wheelwrights and other workmen for manufacturing and maintaining 
carts. Commission for these began on 26 November 1491 and continued
NOTES
E36/285, f76-77 and various other pages throughout 
on Yet Necessities, f52-58
King’s wine to simply Household wine. Shipments totalled 
tonnes, 1 pipe and 1 hoggeshead of wine, 160 Buttes 
Malmsey, 280 pipes of beef, 180 barrels of flour, 2 buttes 
salt and charges of £474.13s.4d. for undisclosed quantities 
wheat. Of the £488.Id. only £6.20d. for shipment of 280 pipes 
of beef from Porchester can be directly linked to a purchase, 













. All other purchases are either lost or presumably 
the payments for sundry supplies bought. 
f76/77.
These were:- William Hatcliffe
Richard Butler 
John Dawtry 
The Merchants of the Staple 
Nicholas Moreton
£3089.19s.lOd. 





up to 29 August,1 intensifying in February 1492 when thirty-four men 
were commissioned to collect horses of all categories for transport 
from the counties of the South, South-West and East of England.
Obviously feeding such large numbers of war and transport 
horses was another problem. On 24 February Thomas Woderobe, clerk of 
the King’s Ordnance, and Richard Bright, purveyor of the avenary and 
livery of the King’s horses, gained commissions to proceed to 
Southampton and 'entreat with the people' there for the purchase of 
liveries, hay, litter and provender for 3000 horse. They were also 
able to buy items necessary for loading horses onto ships; slings, 
nets and 'brugges' (movable landing stages), scythes and sides. They 
were successful in their task; Cope accounts for payment to them by 
Thomas Overey for 450 cartloads of hay, 1500 pipes of oats, 100 
scythes, 400 sides, 332 slings and 12 'Brugges.,l*
NOTES
1. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol.l,ff393-415. Thomas Fawkener to
Alexander Galyon, Sergeant of the King's carriage.
2. Ibid, pp394-5. All commissions were issued in pairs of 
counties to a group of three people except in one case where 
it was to four people:
Oxford and Berkshire, Norfolk and Suffolk.
Northampton and Rutland, Bedford and Buckingham, 
Warwickshire and Leicester, Huntingdon and Cambridgeshire, 
Somerset and Dorset, Nottingham and Derby, to four people, 
Gloucester and Worcester, Surrey and Sussex, 
Essex and Hertfordshire.
Harnesses for these horses and the carts, whipcord, bear and 
ox hides were also purchased in considerable quantities. 
E36/285,f52.
3. C.P.R., 1485-94, vol 1, p396.
4. E36/285, f73.
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One final necessity remains to be mentioned; tents. There was 
no reference to any payment for tents of any description in Cope’s 
accounts yet these were purchased and taken to France. They would 
have undoubtedly been required particularly with the late departure of
mentioning the daily movement of the King’s ordnance to the
the expedition. There are two references to the movement of tents
though; one is in the Paston Letters, the second in Hatcliffe's
account.
On 18 February William Paston wrote to Sir John Paston
coast. He
includes reference to the manufacture of ’tentes and a lys
(pavilions)...and many of them to be made ' and that 'grate
provysyon' was made for all the equipment for the gentlemen ' that
shoulde goo wythe Hys Grace. The list given by William Paston
included 'hors, harness, tents, halys, gardvyanes (knapsacks) cartes
a
and other things.'
The second reference mentions two vessels being required to
carry 'pavilions from Calais to London', in the section in Hatcliffe 
on the repassage of troops from France. No reference is made to the 
size of the vessel or the quantity of tents carried, yet the number
9 
would have been considerable to have required two vessels as it did.
One essential piece of equipment for an army since 1800 was 
the field kitchen. During earlier campaigns, cooking was left to 
individuals or groups using open fires, but one necessity that could 
not be produced in this manner was bread. This problem was foreseen 
and on 4 September 1492 an oven was shipped to Calais for the army.
NOTES
1« The Paston Letters, vol.l, pl43.
2. E36/208, f56-57. The vessels were 'del Jesus del Grifth'
Master John Blunt and 'Trustie ofWadebrigge’ 
Master Robert Lymms.
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How large was it? It cost 51s. and was freighted at a cost of 6s.6d., 
but its portability was not referred to.^
One of the more unusual references made by Cope is also one of 
the earliest listed under 'Necessities for Warre'. Wages were paid in 
coin and large numbers of bags were needed for shipping and carriage. 
301b. of canvas and two great bags were bought for this purpose 
costing 13s.6d., with 8d. charged for making the bags. Another 
necessary item in this respect was the paper and parchment for making 
the account book together with fourteen yards of green cloth for 
tolling and accounting the money on.
There was evidently a clear awareness of the importance of 
sufficient supplies. Careful preparation had been made early on in 
the plans for the invasion. Consequently no reference can be found to 
the troops suffering through lack of any necessity. In the memorial, 
from Henry's captains and councillors on 1 November at Boulogne, lack 
of food or any other necessities do not feature as reasons why the
Qpeace terms should have been accepted. It was therefore possible to 
give greater significance and consideration to the problem of taking 
Boulogne and its defences. More concern was shown for freighting 
supplies across the channel than to their need at that time. Vergil 
states that the men were more occupied with the fact that Henry had 
made peace than with a lack of comforts or of food, or more 
importantly beer.^ Consequently, I believe, all aspects of supply 





4. Anglica Historia, pp53-59.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS: A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS?
60
Many words are synonymous with Henry VII. Most reflect his 
attitude towards money and claims have been made with justification
complications for his own pecuniary advantageinfers this was his
for his later years that any legal method was used to financially
secure the crown. Such claims have been levelled against the
expedition. Dietz, stating Henry made 'ingenious use of foreign
sole motive for the invasion. Others such as Mackie, Chrimes and Van
Cleeve Alexander give the expedition attention because of the profit 
gained. Dietz's account is most widely accepted for the finances and 
amongst other authorities is perhaps hard to improve, even though it 
was composed without the aid of certain sources now available. With 
these it is my intention to clarify the financial account for 1492.
Dietz's account shows between October 1489 and October 1491 
Parliament made several grants aimed at raising sufficient funds to 
keep 10,000 archers in the field for one year. The first grant failed 
to raise the required £75,000, only raising something less than 
£27,000. As a consequence Henry was allowed to call for a 
Benevolence. These were allowed under certain circumstances and 
enabled the King to call for the support of the country in his 
patriotic cause, either through military aid or financial assistance 
in lieu of attendance, which is precisely what was required in July 
1491. Dietz states this raised more than £48,000.Additional
NOTES
!• F.G. Dietz, English Governmental Finance 1481-1558, 1920, p53.
2. Rotuli Parliamentorum, 1820, vi p438.
3. Dietz, op cit., p57.
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revenue came from the church, the Convocation of Canterbury granted 
first £25,000 and later both Canterbury and York allowed a tenth for 
the King’s cause.1 These grants in theory should have raised £15,200 
and £2000 respectively2, adding a further £17,200 to the war chest. 
Dietz continues with his account and shows that Parliament granted a 
further two tenths and fifteenths, with the promise of a third should
3the army stay abroad for more than eight months. Dietz does not
give a sum total for all these grants. Taking each of the
Parliamentary grants of tenths and fifteenths equal £29,000 net^ the
total would have been £87,000. Altogether the King would have
received £204,420 but Dietz does not give such a figure. On the debit 
side, Dietz puts the cost of the expedition at £48,802^, which, by 
assumption, results in a profit in excess of £155,000, yet again this 
is not a figure quoted by Dietz; we are left to account for the figure 
ourselves. Other authorities accept Dietz’s account but fail to quote 
global amounts.
Dietz believed in Henry’s profit motive, he used the war to 
increase the Royal coffers, his subjects apparently oblivious to 'how 
disingenuous were the purposes until after the event'.Dietz infers 
Henry cut corners and economised to make this possible. It is my 
second intention to show this was not the case. That ultimately
NOTES
1. Ibid, p55.
2. A.K. McHardy, Clerical Taxation in Fifteenth Century England: 
The Clergy as Agents of the Crown, in The Church, Politics and 
Patronage in the Fifteenth Century, ed. R.B. Dobson, 1984, 
P169-70.
3. Dietz, op cit., p56.
4. A grant of a tenth and a fifteenth was a specified sum of 
£31,000 gross as fixed in 1334. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., pl96.
5. Dietz, op cit., p57.
6. Ibid, p53.
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savings wets mads, although not rspsid, was mors a testament to the 
methodical approach to the organisation and a statement on the 
problems of collection in a short period of all the grants, than to 
deviousness or any grand scheme to defraud Parliament and the people 
of England.
My first intention is to show how close Dietz came to the 
income for the expedition. The Parliament assembled in January 1489 
granted the King £100,000 for the expedition,£25,000 of which was 
supplied by the Convocation of Canterbury. The £75,000 was to be 
raised through a tenth of annual value of ’issued and profyttes of all 
maners of Honours, Castelles, Lordships, Manors, Landes, Tenements,
oRentes....’’ plus a tax of ls,8d, on every ten marks of movable 
goods. On reassembling in October 1489 it was evident this tax had 
failed. Not quite £27,000^ had been collected and Parliament 
expressed their indebtedness to his majesty to the amount of £48,000. 
Consequently they hoped a grant of a tenth and fifteenth would make up 
the shortfall, with the proviso that £6,000 be deducted for the 
’relieff and discharge of the pore Townes, Cities and Boroughs, 
wasted, desolate or destroyed, or over gretely impoverysshed.
NOTES
1 Rotuli Parliamentorum, 






pl98 and A.K. McHardy op cit., pl89. 
___________________ VI, p421.
Ibid, p438. J.R. Lander, in Government and Community in 
England, 1450-1509, (1980) p341. Lander states this figure 
could have been as low as £20,736.
5. Rotuli Parliamentorum VI, p438.
6. Ibid.
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This grant would clearly not meet the required amount and in 
1491 the ’Benevolence* or Benevolent loan was called. This, invited 
by Signet letters, was very difficult to refuse, but at least the 
recipient had the choice of aiding the King financially in lieu of 
personal service.Consequently in July 1491 a commission was issued 
for raising a Benevolence from the people. Eventually, this raised 
£48,488.16s.8d.,3 but, as many people were slow to pay up, or at least 
the machinery of collection proved slow, there were still insufficient 
sums in the war chest by October 1491. By 1495 arrears for the 
Benevolence were so outstanding it received retrospective 
parliamentary sanction in the content of statutory authority for their 
collection under heavy penalties if collectors or individuals failed. 
Even so, Cope’s account outlines this problem showing it was not fully 
collected until 1501.3
Due to the previous shortfalls and the slow receipts of the 
Benevolence Parliament again looked at the finances in October 1491. 
With the prospect of military action getting closer two tenths and 
fifteenths were granted (less the normal deductions for poor and 
impoverished towns)0, with a third promised should the army be in 
France more than eight months.? Altogether these parliamentary grants 
would have raised a total of £112,735 (£106,471 if the low figure of 
£20,736 for the first grant of 1489 is accepted). To this must be 
added the Benevolence and the Church’s contributions. The
NOTES
1. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p203. In fact many people did both. 
See below p81. “"‘—
2. Foedera, vol xii, p435-443.
3. E36/285, fl and fl5.
4. S.B. Chrimes, op cit., p204 and n.l.
5. E36/285, fl. -----
6. Rotuli Parliamentorum., VI p442.
7. Ibid, p443.
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Convocation of Canterbury had granted £25,000 in 1489 but this was not 
the sole contribution of 1489. The Province of York also granted two 
tenths, a total of £4,000. In 1492 a further tenth was granted by 
both, totalling £17,200. These sums thus total £207,423 (or 
£201,1159, taking the lower figure for 1489) which is very close to 
the figures which can be worked out from Dietz’s account.
Responsibility for these sums fell to Reynold Bray, Treasurer 
of the War, but most of the accounting was left to his deputy, William 
Cope. The survival of Cope's account has enabled this analysis to be 
undertaken. It covers the period 31 January 1492 to 31 January 1501.
Although generally accepted are the amounts collected from the 
various Parliamentary grants, none feature in total in Cope's account. 
£9828.10s.4d. is listed raised through fifteenths and tenths 
('guinzisenies and difince’) while a further £2073.9s.4d. came from 
the tenth of the clergy.This is not strange as Cope was only 
accounting for the money transferred to him for use with the 
expedition. Strangely though, the account lists receipts from sales 
of goods: animals, wine, grain and other perishable commodities; 
totalling £21,174.19s.Id.As these are referred to as 'King's oxen' 
or 'the King's wine', Henry was either being generous or an 
alternative explanation must be sought.The King would not be so 
generous; plausibly these goods were those received in lieu of earlier 
taxes and sold in 1492 to raise ready cash for the expedition, or they 
were goods returned from the expedition and sold with the money 




2. Of this amount £17,392 was at the King’s mint, put there by
John Shaw 1491-2. E36/285, fl5.
3. E36/285, fl5-18.
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The second feature of Cope's account of receipts for the 
expedition was the Benevolence. In 1491 it was supposed to supplement 
the failed Parliamentary grant. Cope's account shows it took until 
15011 to fully collect. Yet when totalled it did amount to
9 
£48,488.11s.8d. It itemises the 'loans' beginning with the Clergy,
who gave £5523.6s.8d., followed by the nobility3 with £3431.6s.8d. 
showing even less generosity. Thus the two supposedly wealthy 
sections of the community contributed only £8954.13s.4d. The 
remaining £39000 came from the section entitled 'Yet Sundrie personnes 
of the Laisee',^ and they are indicative of how widespread the loan 
collectors spread their nets. Twenty-five counties are individually 
mentioned; such as Yorkshire (£969.7s.ld.)’3 Nottinghamshire 
£1337.Is.6d.)’8 Gloucestershire (£3004.4s,5d.)? and Lincolnshire 
(£3356.8d.).8
Unfortunately, as with other sections of Cope's account, there 
are missing files in this section. The sum total is given, but the 



















f6. For a breakdown of payments by the clergy, 








London.1 According to the Chronicle of London and the Chronicle of 
England, London gave £9682.17s.4d., many individuals, most notably the 
Mayor John Matthew, giving £200, while ’some of the meaner sorte 
£100.No such sum or individual amounts survive in Cope. Despite 
recent discoveries and correct insertion clarifying the picture, 
£3126.10s.5d. is still missing from this section, but how much can be 
attributed to London is uncertain. London contributions are 
identifiable in a number of entries; London Merchants, Individuals of 
London and Foreigners, yet these only total £2360.10s.8d. Neither 
the Mayor nor his aidermen are specifically referred to; the single 
largest contribution of a Londoner was £40 from John Winger.Even 
attributing the missing £3126 to London we are still £4000 short of 
the £9682 supposedly given.
£81,565.15s. was paid into the war accounts,£125,858 short 
of the full allowance through all sources. Yet we must remember some 
of this was not fully accounted for in 1492, the second tenth and 
fifteenth granted by Parliament in 1491 was not due to be collected 
till 11 November while the Benevolence took till 1501 to collect. 
Therefore the majority of this sum assumably went directly to the 
King’s Chamber, or to the Exchequer.Yet it does not show up as any 
single large increase in Chamber receipts between 1489 and 1495. The 
yearly average receipt was only £27,000 in that period compared to
NOTES
1. E36/285, f29.
2. Annales, p474. Chronicles of London, pl97.




6. It was more likely the Chamber even though the Exchequer had 
regained its supremacy between 1485-9. The preference of the 
Chamber is confirmed by the closing accounts in Cope where he 
states payments made by either Thomas Lovell or John Heron 
into the King's Chamber, E36/285, f79-80.
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£17,000 between 1487 and 1489, and that has been attributed to more 
careful collection of the King's income.1 Given the growing 
preference of the Chamber though, it is doubtful the money was 
accounted elsewhere.
If it had been Henry's sole aim from the outset, to save a 
good proportion for his coffers, then expenditure would have reflected 
this. My contention is that this was not the case. Examination of 
the accounts reveals that it was never intended to place a token 
force, ill-equipped and ill-supplied, aimlessly on French soil. Every 
aspect was meticulously covered and one is left with the strong 
impression that considerable foresight went into the preparations.
The only aspect wanting in the section entitled 'Yet 
Necessities' is missing and damaged pages caused by the ravages of 
time. Eighty pages do survive of which the majority (f18-80) fall 
within the section on expenditure, pages are still to be discovered 
and correctly replaced. In some sections it is only possible to 
calculate amounts through examining them in reverse. It is my 
intention to examine expenditure in reverse rather than 
chronologically.
Expenditure is divided into seven sections: Wages of War, Navy 
and Stores, King's Ordnance, King's Work, The Sluys Expedition, 
Victuals for the Army, and payments into the King's Chamber. The sum 
total only partly survives, beginning with the notation for £81,000, 
the remainder missing. Meant to be a definitive account it would be 
fair to assume expenditure would equal income. Thus the expenditure 
should also read £81,565.15s.
NOTES
1 S.B. Chrimes, op cit., pl25
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The end section is littered with payments for which very few 
details are given. Some can be identified as entries through 
inefficient book-keeping, the sums not figuring in expenditure, one 
more correctly belonging under income. Some of the remainder giveonly 
tantalising glimpses of what they were for; £1759.19s.4d. for ’sundry 
things’ to the Mayor and Fellowship of the Merchants of the Staple, 
£3467.14s.lid. to John Dawtry for ’salt-petre, bowstaves, Maluesis and 
other charges’.1 Precise details are impossible to enumerate except 
for one instance. One payment of £3089.19s.lOd. was made to William 
Hatcliffe, the King's Avener, for victualling the army. Still extant 
is a book of charges accounted for by Hatcliffe for the expedition, 
but not solely for victuals.^ It comprises charges for travel
expenses for troops at the Siege of Sluys, Wages for troops, both 
English and foreign at the Siege, victuals for the army, and expenses 
for the repassage of troops from Calais at the end of the campaign. 
The total in the book does not tally with that paid to Hatcliffe, 
being in excess of £5600, yet it can be accounted for through other 
entries in Cope of payments to Hatcliffe for aspects of the Siege of 
Sluys and the cost of shipping troops back to England. The sum he 
received was thus for victuals and the charge book reveals a great 
variety including quantities of biscuits, flour, bread and
NOTES
1. E36/285,f76-77. Also recorded were Richard Butler
£623.13s.2d. for victuals and Ordnance. Nicholas Morton 
£502.11s.3d. for victuals. Richard Guildford (master of the 
King's Ordnance) £674.6s.8d. for ordnance.
2. E36/285, f76. An Avener was Chief Officer of the Stable.
3. E36/208.
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beer, Gascon wine, salt beef and fish, stock fish and bean flour, 
considerable quantities of hay and oats for horses together with 
unusual items such as candles, anchor cable, hooks for bending 
crossbows and harness.
Interestingly, Hatcliffe’s references to shipping are more 
detailed than Cope’s. In addition to details of ownership and name, 
hire terms and places of origin, Hatcliffe refers to the size, tonnage 
and ship’s complement. Some ships listed by Hatcliffe appear to be 
Spanish in origin whereas the majority from Cope hail from ports 
around the English coast from Bristol to Hull. Shipping ordered to 
’watch the sea’ during July and August appear Spanish in origin; 
’Katherine de Ranteria’ and the ’Spanish ship Marie Grace', but their 
, 9captains Thomas Fogge and John Clarke infer otherwise. The naval 
aspects of both accounts require deeper study than is desirable here.
One further item that warrants mentioning is beer. References 
to English relying on beer have been made by other authorities, most 
notably Mackie. Evidence is not conclusive, yet beer was bought in 
considerable quantities in 1492. Breweries had earlier been built at 
Portsmouth, but this was a mistake because of the changes that later 
took place. Consequently beer had to be purchased from among the 
local 'here bruers'. Eight individuals are listed as providing 217 
tonnes of beer at a cost of £195.6d., each tonne costing 18s.This 
was expensive considering a later entry for the purchase of 352 tonnes 
and 3 hogsheads at £200, which puts the price of beer per tonne at 
11s.4d.4 The economic pressures of supply and demand played their
NOTES
1. This could either mean armour or bridles and saddles.
2. E36/208, f44.
3. E36/285, f75. These men were Thomas Aldy, Thomas Bever,
Gerard Byser, Robert Bennett, William Cudborough, Lawrence
Capley, John Osborne, John Stonbrigg.
4. E36/285, f76.
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role in defining prices during September 1492. This does not reflect 
a reliance on beer, rather its essential nature in the ordinary man's 
diet at that time.
Provisioning an army, even for a short period, was expensive. 
£16805.8s.3d. was spent on supplies while at Sandwich or in France. 
Even more was spent and recorded under 'Navy and Stores'. There was 
to be no risk of food shortages such as those suffered in earlier 
campaigns, even for one as short as this was intended.
'Navy and Stores' formed an expensive section amounting to 
£13,695.9s.lid. If reliance upon the sea for defence was a simple
solution, the converse was so of launching an army on the continent. 
This problem had been realised early on 10 February 1492. John French 
had been despatched to gather ships from Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk and 
Lincoln.^ French's work was insufficient once plans had been changed 
and two further officers were sent; Anthony Legs and Henry Broke, who 
extended the search area to include Yorkshire. Their powers were 
further advanced, enabling them to pay retainer fees for lost income 
and travel expenses. This cost £933.These three were undoubtedly 
not the only officials at work as ships arrived from outside their 
areas. They had, nevertheless, performed their duties well as the 
largest blocks of ships did come from their area; '10 ships of 
Lynne...10 ships of Kingston-upon-Hul1...24 ships of Southwark...15 
ships of Lowestoft...'3 168 ships came from their counties alone.
NOTES




The remaining 132 came from as far afield as Middlesborough and Hellsmouth 
in North Wales, covering in addition the counties of Somerset, Devon, 
Cornwall and Dorset. The fleet was paid a further £2944.12s.lid. which 
included wages for the Masters and crews, victuals, and the ships tonnage. 
Additionally, twenty-two masters were rewarded for their service, varying 
from 6s.8d. to 30s., but for what service, we are not told.
Only one reference gives precise details as to what the amounts 
were paid for. The Master of the Erasmus received £27 for wages and 
victuals for his crew of 72 for six weeks service. £10.10s. was paid for 
tonnage. It can be calculated that Erasmus was a 210 ton vessel. 
Hatcliffe’s account differs in that the ships tonnage was detailed 
precisely.
300 ships were insufficient for the revised plans and Dutch ships 
were hired to supplement the fleet. They were retained only for the 
outward journey, a period of fifteen days, sufficient for their passage to 
England, the embarkation and disembarkation at Calais. The exact number 
of Dutch is difficult to interpret, three entries indicate the figure of 
335 vessels; two payments made by Thomas Overey, and a third by Thomas 
Warley.
NOTES
1. E36/285, f72. Allowing the same rate of 2s. a ton per quarter as 
received by ship during the Hundred Years War, from C.F. Richmond 
'The War at Sea' in Hundred Years War, ed. K. Fowler (1971), pl08.
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Varley's entry stands out as an example of bad planning costing 
money. It cost £1157.7s.3d. for an indeterminate number of 'hoyes and 
other ships of the Dutch Navy' and was paid on 26 June 1492, the 
approximate date of the original planned invasion.
Overey's payments were more accurate. Shipping was numbered 
originating from ports such as Antwerp, Malines, Middleburg, Arnhem, 
Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leiden, Delft and Dordrecht. 335 ships 
from fifteen ports.Two payments were made by Overey, but confusion in 
the accounting does not give a precise amount as they also included 
payments for English shipping. It can be stated though that 335 Dutch 
ships cost between £2900 and £4600.
The operation to cross the channel cost £13,695.9s.lid., the 
largest proportion of £12,663.15s.7d. being for wages, victuals and 
tonnage of the fleet. £779.12s.4d. was spent on food while the remaining 
£252.2s. was for sundry items: rigging a galley to carry ordnance, the 
purchase of ordnance, bows, sheaves of arrows and bills for a ship for 
Ireland; and royal official's expenses.
The section entitled 'Yet Necessities' covers payments of 
£4177.12s.4d. under three entries. Initial figures for the first entry 
are missing, falling with the missing gathering of wages. The total, 
though, is present; £749.2s.l0d., individual items amount to £738.10s.lid.
NOTES
1. E36/285, f59.
2. E36/285, f59-60. The full list includes places difficult to




so only £10.11s.lid. is unaccounted for.1
The entry is interrupted in the middle of payments for the 
carriage of the King’s money. It lists expenses for the collectors of the 
Benevolence together with a payment of 20s. for the carriage of money to 
the King at Boulogne. Knowing it took until 1501 for the final collection 
of all money, this could indicate the King’s desperate need for ready cash 
during the campaign.
Two further entries give an interesting insight into the routine 
of fifteenth century accounting. The first itemizes equipment:
'greencloth for tolling and accounting upon... 44s.4d.
cost for heating the counting house at St.Paul's....2s.2d.
three paper books for use in accounting...... 5s.
the parchment necessary for the indenture bills.... 12s.
12 lbs of Candles .... 18d.
30 lb of canvas for making Bags for the King’s money 12s.6d.
making the bags............................... 8d.
With carriage costs this totalled £4.11s.8d.^
The second entry concerns John Clerk and his assistants' expenses 




3. E36/285, f53. 
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a forty week period. This is not interesting in itself except that it 
details their exact expenses over the initial three weeks. The cost of 
accounting for each county such as Essex at 6s.8d. and Rutland at 3s.4d., 
their dinners at 2d. a dinner, 36s. in all,^ manufacture of the book 
including copies, and binding, girding and buckling them at 16s.8d. 
Although it was an intense period, not all the work was completed. John 
Clerk and two of his assistants continued work after the expedition had 
returned. Their duties, working from the ’eighth day of purification of 
our Lady (9 February).. .unto the first day of Saint Andrew (30 November)’
9 were poorly rewarded at 4s. a week, no more than ls.4d. each.
This section also contains significant references to transport, 
especially the cost of transporting the King's household goods. John 
Philip, a London wheeler, supplied 21 'close carts or chariots' for 
£81.13s.4d., which, adding all the necessary accoutrements of coverings 
(bear hides) horses, harness and whipcord, cost a staggering total of 
£228.2s. The King's personal diet also formed a considerable single 
payment between 24 September and 13 December 1492. This included 
entertainment expenses and personal meals. John Shipley, Clerk of the 
King's Kitchen, was responsible for the King's diet and spent 
£602.10s.7d., while John Reading, Clerk of the King's Spicery, spent £80 










In the list of freighting charges for food, individual prices for 
1492 can be deduced. An oxen cost 16s., whole dead sheep 21d., a pipe of 
beef between 40s.8d. and 43s.Ad.1 Fish categorised either as salted cod 
or line cod^ were sold according to quality. Salted cod varied between 
40s. and 53s.4d. the 100, while line cod (also salted) cost between £3.5s. 
and £4 the 100.
Freighting these commodities caused problems, especially the wine. 
One entry indicates these problems. Richard Cokke, a cooper of London, 
shipped 50 tonnes from Portsmouth to London, unloaded it at ’Hatter Quay’ 
and ’Haydoke Quay’ and ’Waterlane’, and carried it to cellars to await 
shipment elsewhere, presumably France. He charged for fitting 268 hoops 
on the casks, and ’sponging’ 424 hoops at a cost of 35s.4d. ’Sponging’
was the act of securing the wine from spillage by tightening the casks
with chips of wood.3
These expenses, 'victuals', 'Navy and Stores' and 'Yet
Necessities’, all entitled ’Foreign Payments', amounted to
£48,802.18s.lid. Omitting, for the present, money paid into the King's 
chamber, £22,277.15s.l0d. remains.^ This is the most significant portion
NOTES
1. E36/285, f58. Dependent upon whether Cope purchased them at
Porchester or London.
2. Cod caught by a line rather than by a net.
3. E36/285, f54. The total bill was 103s.2d., carriage of the wine 
cost only 40s.
4. See Appendix E for the breakdown of these sums.
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of the expenditure; the wages bill. Unfortunately no correlation of this 
amount has survived as the page containing the sum total is missing. By 
the process of elimination this figure is calculated and is as accurate as 
possible until the missing gathering is found. Over sixty-five pages do 
survive, twice as many as are assumed lost. For the pages we can examine, 
the wages total is £14,295.3s.Id., thus leaving a similar proportion of 
wages missing as there are pages missing (one third or £7982.12s.9d.)^
The wages are listed according to rank, commencing with Thomas, 
Marquis of Dorset, and ending abruptly during the account to a minor 
esquire, William Middleton and his four archers. The list is irrefutably 
incomplete, omitting many lords known to be present such as John de Vere, 
earl of Oxford. Yet given the rank order of the list, these should have 
been included with the eighteen lords who were accounted for. This 
anomaly can be resolved. Contemporary accounts indicate the army marched 
in a number of battles or army groups, varying from two to four, depending 
on which source is examined. Once the army left the pale of Calais it 
divided into two sections, the main battle, with the King, advanced upon 
Boulogne. A smaller force, under Oxford, was detached upon a wider sweep 
into French territory sacking the towns of Ardes and Mountorye. 
Conceivably, as Oxford's wages together with a third of the total are miss 
-ing, they comprise those made to this detached force and were treated 
separately in Cope's accounts. A large force would not have been 
committed for this purpose, one third would have been appropriate,
NOTES
1. E36/285, f18-50.
2. Vergil, p57, states four battles while the Chronicle of Calais, 
p2, refers to two.
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commanded as it was by the trusted Oxford. This theory has one flaw. All 
Oxford’s force should be missing yet we know he was accompanied by the 
Lords Shrewsbury, Devon, Suffolk, Essex, Strange and Hastings and wage 
payments exist for all of these.1 Why are these Lords' accounts present 
and Oxford’s missing? There is a possible explanation.
All the Lords mentioned were young men, or rather they were not 
older than thirty-four years of age in 1492. They had seen little 
military action, especially upon foreign soil. Desire for military 
success could have driven them to request participation in any action and 
wishing to placate their fervour, the King could have granted them 
permission to temporarily attach themselves to Oxford’s group. Their 
contingents would have remained with the King’s battle. This problem is 
only a minor one and should not distract us from what valuable information 
is contained within the wages accounts.
Such information varies from the period of service to travel 
expenses and areas that exhibited support for the monarch to individual 
support for their King.
Some retinues were gathered from just one locality, for example 
that from which the captain received an income. Others had their living 
and estates spread across England and raising their retinues must have 
been minor feats of organisation in themselves. Thomas, Marquis of
NOTES
1 Chronicle of Calais, p2. Annales, p476. Excerpta Historica, p85 
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Dorset had a following of 222 men, comprised of himself, as a knight, four 
spears, ten demilancers and 174 archers.These men came from as far 
across the country as Lancashire, Shropshire and Cornwall and were paid 
6d. for every twenty miles travelled, no distinction being made between
9
those on foot and those on horseback. Ten travelled 235 miles between 
Lancashire and Canterbury, while the largest group, of 73 men, 
unsurprisingly, travelled the fifty miles from London. £13.18s.3d. was 
paid in travel expenses to Thomas’ men.
Each soldier's daily wage was listed; 2 shillings for a knight,
18d. for a spear, 9d. for a demilancer and 6d. for an archer. Thomas, 
Marquis of Dorset's retinue served from 17 September to 5 December 1492 
receiving £450 in wages. Eleven weeks and three days service meant 
individually they received £8 for Thomas, £6 for a spear, £3 for the 
demilancers, while the archers received £2. To this would have been added 
other indeterminate sums such as rewards of battle, ransom and shares of 
captured booty. For anyone below the rank of retinue leader, this only 
amounted to a third share of the total value of their personal capture. 
One further third was given to their retinue captains, the final third
E36/285, fl8. The remaining 13 were presumably 'Custrels and 
pages' attendant upon a knight and other men-at-arms.
E36/285, fl8. The complete list reads - London 73 men, Cornwall 
45, Somerset 8, county of Warwick 52, Wiltshire 8, Hertfordshire 
2, Northampton 3, Shropshire 5, Lancashire 10, Essex 6,
Oxfordshire 8 
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went to the King.1
The single largest payment of wages, other than the King's guard, 
was made to Sir John Savage's retinue, or rather his deputy considering
9 Savage was one of only three named casualties during the expedition.
Savage's wages bill of £782 was matched by his travelling expenses for 
£48.10s. as the largest payment. His retinue of 368 men travelled
3 considerable distances to reach Canterbury.
Of the 118 entries extant in Cope, 62 did not receive travel 
expenses. Of these, sixteen came from Sluys, and were presumably paid 
earlier, while a further six joined at Calais.Conceivably the remaining 
forty travelled less than fifty miles to join the musters at Kent and so 
could not claim. The bill for travel expenses for the fifty-six permitted 
to claim came to £715.3s.3d. These expenses form only 5% of the surviving 
wages. Given a similar percentage in the missing pages £399.2s.7d. would 
allow for expenses there. The accuracy of such a sum is doubtful, but 
with no other means of account, one has no choice but to extrapolate such 
an amount.
NOTES
1. E163 22/3/3 Ordnances for War, p28. E101 72/3, 4, 5 and 6. This
was an ancient custom reinforced through each captain's agreement.
2» Anglica Historia, pl59. The other two were George (?) de Vere.
Hall, p452-3 and Sir Thomas Milbone E36/285, f32.
3. E36/285, f27, 200 men travelled 220 miles from Clifton (Derbyshire 
?), 174 travelled 200 miles from Mansfield (Macclesfield ?) in the 
county of Chester. The greatest distance travelled was 320 miles 
by Sir John a Musgrave from Bowcastle and Clement Shelton Esquire 
from Carlisle. E36/285, f30 and f41.
4. These were Giles Lord Daubeney, Gracion de Alnezade, Sir James 
Tyrell,Roland de Bella Ville Esquire, John Soidrac and Pierre 
Champagne, E36/285,, f20, 23, 44 and 45.
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The extant wages, less expenses, amounted to £13,569.16s.lOd. The 
King’s Royal guard received the greatest single payment. For accounting 
purposes they were listed under their captain, Sir Charles Somerset and on 
their behalf he received £1109.18s. The guard contained Somerset, as a 
knight, eight demilancers, 157 yeomen at 12d. four yeomen at 8d., 
presumably archer sergeants, and 101 archers. Losses during the campaign 
reduced their numbers by two demilancers, one yeoman, one archer sergeant 
and one archer. Two archer sergeants and the yeomen remained on the 
payroll until the last possible moment, while the remainder ceased to be 
paid after 18 December. Considering Henry had returned to Dover by 17 
December he would have been accompanied by some of his bodyguard and it 
was presumably these that carried out this duty, that is eight 
demilancers, one archer sergeant and 100 archers.
Among the wages one anomaly remains. William Bulstrode and eleven 
men attended the muster at Canterbury, travelling 150 miles and were paid 
28s.6d. for their expenses. However, they were not retained for the 
King's service, either they were not suitable or they arrived too late for 
the passage, but were still paid for their trouble.
The wages bill accounts £13,569.16s.l0d. for 7876 men. We know 
that a further £7982.12s.9d. is unaccounted for and must fall within the 
missing gathering covering wages. By a simple equation, deducting 5% for 







assumed to be contained within the missing gathering. Thus a total force 
of 12,278 troops should be contained within the wages accounts on this 
basis.
Finally the wages accounts detail some of those who paid out the 
wages to the individual captains. William Hungat was the most frequently 
mentioned ’muster-roller’, as Cope terms these men, but this term was only 
used twenty-six times out of 118 and only six men were so named.
All that remains to be discussed is Henry’s profit. With the 
account not being concluded until 1501, a profit was not immediately 
apparent, yet £8300 was paid into the King’s Chamber by Thomas Lovell on 
12 January, through a bill by John Heron. Heron appears to be responsible 
for collecting together these amounts, two other entries of money, paid to 
Lovell, are under his name. In 1493 Heron was Lovell’s assistant 
accountant, and in 1506 he succeeded Lovell in the capacity of Treasurer 
of the Chamber. Could it be that his appointment had been influenced by 
his work in the year 1492-3?^ Nearly £1000 appears in the form of twenty- 
six bills of rewards, gifts and expenses returned to the Chamber by Heron. 
Apparently these were unclaimed and returned to the King. One can only 
speculate as to why, and whether Henry was happy to see his gifts 
returned? £10,485.9d. was delivered into the Chamber as his surplus for
NOTES
1. The others were Thomas Stoke, Nicholas Kirkham, Humphrey Sarrard, 
John Lee and William Hatcliffe.
2. The date of Heron's appointment to Treasurer is difficult to 
ascertain and could conceivably have occurred earlier than 1506. 
J.R. Hooke’s article 'Some cautionary notes for Henry VII's 
Household and Chamber System' Speculum XXXII (1958), pp69, 75 
cited in S.B. Chrimes, Henry VII, p!26. n.3^
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the expedition, but this was not the total profit.1
There are entries in Cope that indicate the inclusion of certain 
expenses that, arguably, belonged in other accounts such as Household or 
Privy Accounts. Alternatively, no one at the time knew exactly where 
these should have been incorporated.
The King’s diet cost £602.10s.7d. while in France, yet one payment 
of £100 was dated from when Henry was back in England. Gilwyn Ap Rice 
received £47.6s.8d. at Shene on 8 May 1492 for horses bought by Henry. 
Given that £1 to £2 was a good price for a horse this appears to be 
excessive. Either these were exceptional horses, or a considerable number 
for the King’s personal use.
Payments for the King’s Guard on campaigns was justified, but the 
majority served for four months rather than the average three. 
Additionally, Charles Somerset was credited with a separate payment of 
£18.13s.4d. for the guard from 1 September to 18 September. At this time 
Henry was on his way to the musters, the invasion had not yet begun.
One cannot argue over the payment to John, Yeoman of the King’s 
robes, of £304.4d. for coats of arms, banners, royal Standards and other 
apparel, these were necessary for a Royal army. However, the following 
entry could appear wrongly placed. £1970.7s.9d. was paid to John Shaw, 
the King’s goldsmith, for embellishing the King's personal armour. The 








other precious stones, in addition to gilting the horse harness and other 
pieces. This flamboyant armour was necessary as Henry would have wanted 
to impress the French Ambassadors, important considering the later 
negotiations.
Also included were the expenses for the construction of the dock 
and harbour defences at Portsmouth, costing £2343.2s.9d. This
construction was necessary because of the growing importance of naval 
power during the Tudor period, but such a programme was not a short-term 
project and justifying it on the grounds of the expedition in 1492 is 
questionable, but perhaps not unexpected.
£10,485 was the sum of income over expenses paid into the Chamber 
from Cope's account, but with the above entries a further £5490.Is.5d. 
could be added. But should it be?
Finally, to this sum must be added a further £125,858 which Cope 
was not responsible for, but was granted in one form or another. 
Altogether a total of £136,343, a massive sum which rivals the sum Henry 
gained through the Treaty of Etaples.
In conclusion, we can only be impressed by the thought and 
planning taken over the expedition. The accounts exhibit a high degree of 
complexity, of which most of the responsibility must be credited to the 
King's advisers and counsellors, yet we cannot overlook Henry's undoubted 
role in the planning.
NOTES
1. E36/285, f74.
2. There were four entries concerning the dock's construction
£2343. 2s. 9d
E36/285, f73 £1369. 4s. 6d
f73 £ 595. 11s. 7d
f76 £ 136. 13s. 4d
f78 £ 241. 13s. 4d
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Cope’s Receipts are a detailed and exact account of the collection 
and expenditure of the money for 1492. Unfortunately there are 
arithmetical mistakes, not surprising considering the chequered cloth 
system was still used 300 years after its conception. Despite these crude 
problems, the final debits and credits balance (we must make this 
assumption as there is insufficient evidence to prove otherwise) and 
£136,343 profit appears an excessive amount and one that would have been 
talked about at the time, or referred to in contemporary accounts. It was 
far from intentional; a small part consisted of returned rewards, and how 
many others were accepted and have not been accounted thus reducing the 
amount of the profit? The fact that such a large amount was accrued over 
the expedition was testament more to the problems of raising money 
quickly. In all probability this sum was unknown to Henry and I have many 
reservations about its accuracy. Henry had set out for reasons other than 
profit in 1492, his domestic and international standing were more at stake 
than his monetary requirements. A treaty such as gained by Edward IV in 
1475 would have been uppermost in his thoughts, while any extra gained 
through prudent management or otherwise was a bonus.
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CHAPTER SIX;
THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT
86
Determination of the level of support, both financial and 
military, which Henry VII received for the expedition involves complex 
analysis. Evidence for earlier expeditions has survived to a greater 
degree and subsequent knowledge of their levels of support have been more 
accurately deduced. In his work on the subject, Powickehas indicated 
the level of support Henry V received, and has shown that with the 
withdrawal of this support and loss of interest in the French wars, the 
loss of the Hundred Years War and English territory inevitably followed. 
He concludes by saying it was 'causually related..(to)..the decline of 
parliamentary taxation' that accelerated this loss. Interestingly, A.E. 
Goodman's work on Yorkshire takes this further and is able to illustrate 
the level of response, ability to serve and explanation for refusal to 
serve in Henry V's armies and can do so through the survival of relevant 
documentation.It is more difficult to assess the support for Edward 
IV's campaign in 1475 and is closer to the problem of 1492, yet it too has 
more extant sources and a detailed survey has been completed by J.R. 
Lander.5
Compounding the problem of 1492 is not simply the lack of sources, 
but additionally the incompleteness of surviving ones. Consequently, 
Powicke can confidently state that twenty peers supported Henry V with 
over half the total force of the Agincourt campaign,^ while Lander can 




3» A.E. Goodman, 'Responses to Requests in Yorkshire for Military
Service under Henry V' Northern History, vol. XVII (1981).
4. The work is based upon a document catalogues as a 'Role of excuses
from Military Service (York)', Public Record Office, Exchequer 
Various Accounts.
J.R. Lander. Crown and Nobility, pp223-241.
M.R. Powicke - op.cit. p373.





precise and can only speculate given available evidence. Yet, surprising 
details do emerge. Of fifty-six peers known and old enough to serve in 
1492^ twenty-five (45%) can be positively identified as present with the 
King,a further three indentured lords most probably did, making the 
attendance 50%. Significant as this is it is not as high as we might 
expect. The Burton Abbey Register suggests the attendance of a further 
six lords; three were Thomas Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, Thomas Stanley, 
Earl of Derby and John Ratcliffe, Lord Fitzwalter and together this would 
make thirty-four nobles or 61% attendance. Were the remainder expressing 
their dissatisfaction towards the King for his failure to employ them in 
administrative posts, during his early years, in the only way they dared 
to? Some might conceivably have been employed on the Regency council. No 
list has survived to confirm even Bedford's presence and the council could 
conceal other missing nobles.
What of the numbers of troops these peers led? Unfortunately only 
sixteen have their retinues recorded and these account for 2058 troops out 
of 7843, only 26%. If we include the three indentured lords, where 
presence and exact retinue is unconfirmed, this figure rises to 2311. To 
do this we must also add other indentured persons and so the total also 
increases to 9095, thus reducing the lords proportion to 24.5%.This
NOTES
1. Although Henry Algernon, Earl of Northumberland's retinue was 
repassaged he was only 15 in 1492 and it is doubtful he was 
present.
2. These are peers referred to either in Cope, Hatcliffe, the 
Memorial outside Boulogne or the Chronicle of Calais.
3. Jasper Tudor, Duke of Bedford, was thought to have attended
although 61 in 1492. Miss Condon's work suggests he was on Prince 
Arthur's council. He was not a signatory to the Memorial for 
peace at Boulogne, as would have been expected. Cope mentions
that Bedford's retinue was led by his esquire, Owen Ap Janken (two 
spears and sixty archers from South Wales, E36/285, f45).
4« If we also add the Burton Abbey Register figures, the lords' total
rises to 2956 out of 11,806 or 25%, a consistent proportion of the 
total force.
88
would appear to support the premise that the nobility were showing 
dissatisfaction, and were unwilling to support the enterprise.
Alternatively, they were unable to. Comparing this with the expeditions 
of Henry V and Edward IV reveals a stark contrast. The peers of both 
monarchs raised retinues that constituted half of their respective forces 
and with fewer individual retinues. This can be explained. Both Henry V 
and Edward IV found considerable support from their brothers. For Henry 
V, Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester, led 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers, 
while Thomas, Duke of Clarence, contracted for the largest single company 
of 240 men-at-arms and 720 archers. John, Duke of Bedford, was entrusted 
as guardian of England and ably supported the King in that capacity. 
Although such quality of support was lacking for Edward IV, the quantity 
was not. Richard, Duke of Gloucester and George, Duke of Clarence, each
9
led ten men-at-arms, one hundred lancers and one thousand archers. Henry 
VII had no such brothers nor any peer capable of leading a retinue 
approaching these figures.
Additional to the support of brothers for Henry V, Powicke 
classifies retinues of more than twenty men-at-arms as ’Greater 
companies’. For 1492 there are only eleven such companies identifiable 
amongst the indentures, only four of which were lords; Lord Powis, 61 men- 
at-arms/10 archers, Viscount Welles23/29, and twenty halberdiers, George 
Earl of Kent, 22/81, and Lord Hastings 20/66 and twenty others.The 
remainder, bar one, were knights. The largest were Sir Rhys Ap Thomas, 
259/60 plus 200 spears,$ Sir Richard Pole 101/20 and 20 others,
NOTES
1. M.R. Powicke, op.cit, p373.
2. J.R. Lander, op.cit, p237 and Appendix E.
3. Op.cit, p373.
4. E101/72/3 nos. 2, and 7;/5 no.23;/6 no.3 respectively.
5. E101/72/6, no.9. The 200 spears could have been men-at-arms as 
the term spear was often used to denote them. In this case the 
word was ’sprete’ meaning the long pole spear used by foot 
soldiers traditional to North Wales.
6. E101/72/4, no.14.
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Sir John Savage 60/I40and Sir ReynoIde Bray 36/308.
The fact was very different from the promises. There were only 
eight ’Great companies' identifiable through Cope with only one led by a 
lord, Lord Strange 53/357.3 One other was listed under the section 
heading of 'Barons', but this was led by a foreign mercenary recruited at 
Calais; Gracion de Alnevezarde leading 45 spears, 49 demilancers, 
seventeen men at 13d a day and sixteen men at 6d a day.^ The remaining 
companies which can be called 'Great' were led by knights; Richard Pole 
102/195,3 John Savage 36/330,Rhys Ap Thomas 298/292,? James Tyrell 
41/120 and 31 crossbows,® and Edward Borough 27/148.9 Apart from Tyrell, 
all ratios varying significantly away from the preferred one. On 
examination of other lords known to be present, only Thomas, Marquis of 
Dorset, comes close to the title of 'Great Captain' with 15/194,1® while 
George, Earl of Shrewsbury 7/283, H and Edward, Earl of Devon 
5/174, ¿reveal ratios in excess of thirty to one. Even Bedford's retinue 
led by Owen Ap Janken amounted to only 2/60.1®
Although knights like Thomas and Savage brought significant
numbers of men-at-arms, most of the remainder brought small retinues of 
men-at-arms, even a knight like Sir Edward Poynings could only find four 










E101/72/3, no.10. The others were Sir John Grays 70/32, 
E101/72/3, no.14, Sir Walter Herbert 25/100, E101/72/6, no.2 and 
the 'other'; Richard Clifford 25/6 E101/72/5, no.7.
E36/285, f22. 4. E36/285, f23.
E36/285, f25. Overall a 6. E36/285, f27. A large drop in
slight decrease compared to the number of men-at-arms he
his indenture. promised, compensated by the 
considerable increase in 
archers.
E36/285, f35. An increase 8. E36/285, f28.
on both counts except 9. E36/285, f34.
archers replaced spearmen. 10. E36/285, fl8. 11. E36/285,fl9.
E36/285, f!9. 13. E36/285, f45.
E36/285, f26. Only one other knight led a substantial force;
Robert Curzon 8/203, E36/285, f33.
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The squires and other gentlemen fared little better. The largest 
were John Morton 4/126,William Stanley 0/82,and John Huse 4/37,all 
squires; Mathew Baker with 1/31^ was the leading gentleman.
Even the King's guard, led by Sir Charles Somerset, did not follow 
the traditional ratio with nine men-at-arms, 156 yeomen at 12d a day, four 
yeomen at 8d a day and 101 archers.$ Additionally, men from the King's 
household, led by Christopher Vincent, amounted to 19 men-at-arms and 161 
archers.6 The only Bishop to lead a retinue was the Bishop of Bath with 
13 men-at-arms and 131 archers.?
Although large retinues were lacking the army was achieved by 
numerous small retinues led by knights, squires and gentlemen. So far up 
to 162 retinues of this type can be positively identified, but only sixty 
could be called men of prominence, that is, having retinues of at least 
twenty men. The remainder either led smaller retinues or their presence 
is known but their retinue size is not. While such attendance and retinue 
size is not impressive it is considerably more than that which Lander 
o
ascribes to the expedition of 1475. It is not, however, sufficient to 
indicate major support, or indifference, or hostility to Henry VII's war 
policy, as Lander feels confident in reflecting so for Edward IV in 1475.
Although these figures do not show the King could call on a few 
individuals for maximum support, they do give evidence for the widespread 
existence of sizable retinues. This confirms Cameron's argument in his 
article; yet some of his details are incorrectly stated due to his 
reliance on The Burton Abbey Register rather than Cope's Wages accounts.^ 
However, both do reflect the potential of these retinues and must not 















E36/285, f37-41. Vincent was Marshal of the King's Hall. 
Interestingly all those he led were named, some with their 
positions in the Household and five at their own cost; John 
Shirley, Clerk of the Kitchen, William Ratcliffe, Sergeant of the 
Cellar, Edward Sharpe and Thomas Barnard of the Acatrie, and Ralph 
Woodward.
E36/285, f37. 8. Lander, op.cit, p239. 9. Ibid.
A. Cameron, The Giving of Livery and Retaining in Henry VII's 
reign, op.cit, p22-3
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The analysis of finance is also indicative of ability or inability 
to support the King. The nobility’s contributions to the Benevolence were 
recorded. Twelve peers and three peeresses donated £3431.6s.8d. out of 
the total £48,488.16s.8d., only 7.1%, but even half of this sum came from 
the three peeresses. However, nine of these lords actually attended with 
retinues, two probably did so, only John, Lord Denham did not, but he was 
on Arthur’s regency council. Unsurprisingly the most generous donation 
came from Henry's mother, the countess of Richmond; £666.13s.4d; the 
Duchess of York gave £100, while the Duchess of Norfolk gave £326.13s.4d. 
John, Lord Denham led the noble payments with £400, while Edward, Lord 
Hastings could manage only a meagre £28 in comparison.Notable in their 
absence from the list of nobles were John de Vere, Earl of Oxford, Thomas 
Grey, Marquis of Dorset and George Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury to name but 
three. Yet in theory payment was in lieu of attendance and these did 
attend, but then how does this explain those nine lords who did both? 
Altogether 44 peers did not contribute towards the Benevolence. Cross 
referencing these with those who attended, excluding John, Lord Denham and 
Jasper, Duke of Bedford who were on Arthur's council, we are left with 19 
lords who neither contributed nor attended; thus 34% of the nobility did 
nothing to assist the King in 1492. These included Edward Stafford, Earl 
of Wiltshire, William Beaumont, Viscount Beaumont and Richard Beauchamp, 
Lord Beauchamp. 66% support appears substantial, but when it only amounts 
to 20% of the army and 3.3% of the Benevolence this significance dwindles. 
It would appear that by 1492 the English nobility was either depleted 
financially, their ability to support the monarch limited, or they just 
did not wish to support him. Nevertheless, they did attend in 
comparatively large numbers, between 50% and 60%, but nowhere achieving 
the retinue numbers of their counterparts for Henry V and Edward IV.
NOTES
1 E36/285, f7. See also Appendix B 
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In 1415 the nobility were wealthier, Henry V had no problems raising 
finance for his campaign, but Edward IV also faced financial problems of 
the same nature as Henry VII. In 1475 the nobility only contributed 
£2461.3s.4d.of the Parliamentary levy of one tenth.This appears to 
support the argument that the decline of the position of the nobility had 
been a gradual process between the reigns of Henry V and Henry VIII and 
was not something peculiar to Henry VII. Alternatively, the nobility were 
simply not interested in foreign enterprises of a military nature. Can we 
see here the beginning of the insular attitude of the English as a whole?
Examination of the clergy reveals a similar pattern. Although not 
expected to lead retinues, although one did, they would have been 
expected to support the King financially. Clerical taxation showed 
considerable support amounting to over £40,000. However, individually 
this was not the case through the Benevolence. Only nine Bishops recorded 
payments towards the Benevolence, varying from £100 from the Bishop of 
Chester to £1500 from Piers Courtney, Bishop of Winchester. For the 
lower clergy, Winchester again appears wealthier; the prior of 
St.Swithin’s contributed £333.6s.8d. Only four ordinary priests are 
mentioned^ while monastic houses varied considerably from Waverley’s £20 
to Chertsey’s £133.6s.8d.
The total clerical contribution amounted to £5523.6s.8d. Why so 
few clergy paid and little was raised is difficult to ascertain. Neither 
Archbishops are mentioned, which is strange considering John Morton’s 
support for Henry, and only half of the Diocesan bishops contributed,
NOTES
1. Lander, op.cit, p226.
2. Richard Fox, Bishop for Bath and Wells led 10 spears, 3 
demilancers and 131 archers. He also donated £266.13s.4d. to the
Benevolence, but then he was Keeper of the Privy Seal. E36/285, 
f36 and f6-7.
3. E36/285, f6-7. Full details can be found in Appendix B.
4. Bostock priest £60. Martin Priest £50. Thomas Burwelt
£33.1s.8d., and Robert Tyworth 66s.8d. E36/285, f7.
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Financial support from the ranks below the nobility and clergy 
appears to be more decisive. The Parliamentary grants raised in excess of 
£27,000: the Benevolence achieved more than £48,000. As has been stated, 
only a small proportion of these sums came from the nobility, that is, 
both temporal and spiritual. Consequently, the major portion came from 
the lower classes in society; knights, merchants and commoners; the very 
people whom Lander would have us believe were ’hostile to the war policy 
in 1475*. Can it be that most of the population were "Lancastrians" deep 
down, or had popular opinion of foreign involvement changed so 
dramatically over sixteen years? This could be the case and with a just 
cause, an even more plausible argument. The modern analogy of the 
Falklands crisis shows how popular anti-war fervour can very quickly 
change and how flagging support for a leader can be revived through taking 
an openly hostile attitude towards an apparent aggressor. Similarly, 
Henry V had a just cause in 1415. Edward IV though was trying to deflect 
the energies of his more military minded subjects and Parliament itself 
was clearly suspicious of his motives. In the Parliamentary grant for 
that expedition the members added a proviso that any money not spent was 
to be returned to the taxpayers.Henry VII did not have a cause so 
glorious as Henry V (yet he did make allusions towards Henry V in his use 
of designs on the cover of his Book of Ordnances, see Appendix D), nor a 
Falklands of Mrs.Thatcher. However, the cause of Anne of Brittany may 
have stirred the hearts of the ordinary tax-paying Englishman.
NOTES
1. Lander, op.cit, p226
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£39,534.3s.4d. was donated and promised by the knights and 
commoners. Why such a large sum when they had already paid one tenth, and 
one tenth and fifteenth amounting to a sum approaching £60,000? Could 
this reflect the deep changes occurring in English society during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries? Alternatively, the ’Hundred Years War' 
and the ’Wars of the Roses’ may have taken such a toll on the wealth and 
motivation of the nobility they found it difficult to support the crown, 
while the wealth of the knights and merchant classes had grown so 
considerably that they could afford to, and wished to, financially support 
ventures by the crown. This is evident from the sums received. Of 72 
individual entries entitled 'Sundry Personnes of the Laisee’,^ 
contributions varied from £500 by Sir Reynolde Bray, to 23s.4d. by Johanne
9Couper, a widow of Southampton. £4543.11s.6d. came from such
individuals, an average of £40. The remainder in global sums came from 
county contributions. Lincolnshire showed either great wealth or great 





3. This is a modal average. The median is £250.11s.8d. and the mean 
£63.2s.Id.
4. E36/285, fl4a and fl4b. For Herefordshire individuals were named, 
the Prior of Hereford £34, Sir Edward Nime 20s and Sir John 
Fortescue £14.10s.
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The ranks of knights, gentlemen, squires and the merchant classes 
were therefore sufficiently motivated for them to provide the largest 
financial and military proportions of the largest army that had left 
England since the campaigns of Edward III. Henry could not have achieved 
this without considerable backing for the principles behind the 
expedition. Vergil goes further.He states that when the English heard 
of Maximilian’s failure to support their venture against Charles VIII:





story were astonished that (the) man...could 
not aid the English in their attack upon the
This eagerness for the cause, or could it be simply anti-French 
feelings or a lust for booty, also finds more support from Vergil through 
his references to the necessity to publish the document outlining the 
reasons for declaring peace before the cause had been won. The 
declaration upset the English army and the soldiers were:
’immeasurably grieved that this unreasonable agreement should 
deprive them of the occasions of successful action - an 
occasion...they had...long and earnestly sought, and which they 
despaired of readily coming upon afterwards. Wherefore they were 
indignant and angry with Henry.
Vergil is referring to the Memorial outside Boulogne,^ The
negotiations and the subsequent declaration of peace to have a smooth
publication of this, with its numerous references to the hazards of
continuing the campaign, reflects there was a level of support for




1. Unsurprisingly Hall reflects this point, only more strongly.
2. Vergil op.cit., p55. Hall, however, puts it: ’they marvayled and 
wondered greatly...Maximilian’s receavyng such great vilany not 
longe before at the hand of Kyng Charles was not present to pricke 




passage. Signed by eighty-one leading nobles, knights and gentlemen it 
indicates the spread of support for the King’s action. It purports to be 
a memorial from these captains entreating Henry to accept the terms 
offered by the French. It was more a document produced to explain to the 
ordinary soldier and captains why the cause was being abandoned, hoping to 
placate them. The army had to be reminded that their successes were 
greater than those of Edward IV, with greater added problems to face. The 
peace terms were generous, it was pointed out that to refuse would have 
caused uproar in England. Worded in such strong terms it was expected to 
encourage the King's acceptance of the treaty and speedy return to 
England. But Vergil and Hall, the ordinary soldiers, and many in England, 
were not so easily convinced. Is this indicative of support for the 
expedition's cause and anger at its premature conclusion? Conversely it 
could indicate anger for expending money and resources for very little 
gain and a mistrust of the King's true motive for the invasion. 
Nevertheless it is recorded that Henry returned in triumph to his capital, 
the Mayor and Aidermen and the commoners dressed in violet, meeting him at 
Blackheath and leading him to St.Paul's, through streets of cheering 
crowds no doubt.This was either a spontaneous show of loyalty, 
affection and joy at the King's safe return and success, or a well stage- 
managed affair by the King's agents, or the councillors of London were 
afraid anything to the contrary would have angered his majesty.
From the sources it is difficult to assess the true nature of 
support for the venture. Even the Paston Letters, normally forthright in 
their version of feelings, leave only ambiguous evidence. William Paston, 
stating his intention to join the King, does so in such a matter-of-fact 
way that could indicate indifference, a sense of duty or simply
NOTES
1. The Chronicle of London, ppi97-8.
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inevitability about his participation.Roger L’Estrange, in his letter 
to Sir John Paston, conversely gives a sense of desperation, almost fear, 
that if he did not reach his quota of troops he would suffer the King's 
anger. He beseeches Sir John's help and even that of Sir Terry Robart, a 
neighbour of the Paston's, to raise or find him three archers, promising
9them not only the King's wages but 'some what elies' besides.
It is also unclear whether the Parliament of 1491, which voted the 
grants for the expedition, had any depth of support for Henry. Edward IV 
found his Parliament had deep reservations for his expedition, requiring 
the repayment of unspent money and not even trusting him with the money: 
any amounts raised were not to be paid into the Royal Exchequer, but a
committee of trustees including the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 
Bishop of Ely. There were no such conditions upon Henry. His Parliament 
appeared more concerned with guarantees that Captains, appointed to lead 
contingents, did so properly and ensured the correct payment of their 
soldiers. Superficially it appears Henry had the full backing of 
Parliament, both Lords and Commons. At least six of his thirteen chief 
ministers were present on the campaign and over half of the Lords 
(temporal). Yet when we examine the Commons it is a different matter. Of 
294 M.P.'s present in 1491,only 28 (9%%) can be positively identified as 
supporting the King through their presence with a retinue, through giving 





The Paston Letters, p143.
Ibid.
Lander op.cit, p226.
History of Parliament, 1439-1509, J.C. Wedgwood, 1938, p551.
There were no M.P.'s for Bath.
Only four can be identified as doing both: Sir John Fortescue led 
9 demilancers/58 archers and gave £14. Sir Thomas Lovell 5 
spears, 13 demilancers/I74 archers and gave £400. Thomas Knight 
Esquire and Sir Reynolde Bray led retinues as shown by Hatcliffe 
and gave £160 and £500 respectively.
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Parliamentary rolls for 1491 can be similarly identified, although their 
lack of leading retinues is not surprising as they would need to be 
present in England to watch and protect the country. * This duty did not 
exclude them from giving monetary aid. Only one did so, Sir Edward 
Berkeley, sheriff of Hampshire, gave £120. This reflects only limited 
support. Parliament had been prepared to vote money, but very few members 
went so far as to assist personally.
Contradictory evidence can be found, such as the Commissioners 
required to enlist the support of the men of their counties or Lordships. 
Of 96 named commissioners, 39 (41%) personally raised and led retinues and 
more presumably did so, but so far the evidence evades us. This is still 
a significant proportion, but not sufficient on its own to be indicative 
of overwhelming support. It could be expected that those required to 
persuade others to join the King should raise and lead retinues of their 
own to lead by example, and it could be as many as 59% did not do so.
It does begin to be apparent that enthusiasm was there amongst 
some of the King’s subjects, but was not the same as that for the 
campaigns of Henry V. In 1492 England was no longer a land of military 
adventurers as could be said of 1415. Was it that already these men had 
been replaced by men better versed in trading skills than martial ones and 
were attracted more to ventures and expeditions such as those of the 
Cabots at the end of the fifteenth century? Perhaps the process of making 
England ’a nation of shopkeepers' as Napoleon believed, had already begun 




1« C.P.R. 1485-94, vol.l, p400. The sheriffs of the Southern
counties were order to keep ready and watch at all times. 
E36/285, f8.
C.P.R., 1485-94, vol.l, pp348-9.
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Perhaps one explanation for the lack of participation by the 
nobility could be their age. Either lords were too young or too old and 
infirm to take part. Analysis of their known ages reveals interesting 
details. The oldest peer attendant was 57 years of age, a place of virtue 
held jointly by Thomas Stanley, Earl of Derby and Henry, Lord Grey of 
Codnor. The youngest could have been Henry Algernon, Earl of 
Northumberland, 14 in 1492, today he would have been classed too young. 
His attendance was not certain, the references only talk of his retinue as 
if he was not with it. The youngest positively identified could fall to 
either George Neville, Lord Bergavenny, or Edmund, Duke of Suffolk. It is 
difficult to say which as neither have a confirmed birth date. George 
Neville is believed born in 1471 while Edmund was supposedly born in 1472, 
making him the younger, but both or either could be a year out either way.
Consequently youth nor old age stopped lords attending, but what 
of the non-attenders. The youngest identifiable was Lord Beauchamp of 
Powicke at 17, the oldest was Reynold, Lord Grey of Wilton, at 71 a grand 
age even by today’s standards of longevity. Of the 34 known to have 
attended the age of 27 is known,the average age being 36 (fifteen were 
actually aged between 20 and 36). Of the 19 lords who nether attended nor 
gave Benevolence money the age of 12 is known. Their average age was 44, 
but seven were either 50 or over, four were under 30. Only two over 50 
attended and eight under 30 years.
It can therefore be stated that age was not a significant factor 
as to attendance or non-attendance, but it could be said that the ideal 
age for attendance was between 30 and 50. In this case only one lord, 
Henry Clifford, Lord Clifford, was notable for his absence. On this basis 
support from the nobility was virtually unanimous.
NOTES
1. Of the remaining seven, four have the dates of their death known.
2. This also excludes Bedford as his retinue was there.
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The evidence therefore has generally shown rather a lack of
enthusiasm and overwhelming support for the expedition, yet we are
unfortunate in not knowing all the reasons why most people were not so
inclined. Explanations have been recounted for those not prepared to join 
Henry V at a time when military fervour was at its height.Such evidence 
is lacking for Henry VII. Those not wishing to join Henry V needed good 
excuses not to do so, by Henry VII’s reign there were no great 
expectations and the commissioners did not need to record reasons for 
refusal in such detail. Despite this some did show their disinclination 
openly and felt a need to explain themselves.
Henry had begun his preparations early. Indentures indicating the 
willingness and agreement to raise retinues were issued and the earliest 
were signed from 6 March 1492 onwards. In appearance these documents 
seem to have been signed at or near the King's residence after discussion 
with his majesty. They form a stylised pattern throughout. Each 
indenture was a prewritten agreement with space left for the contracted to 
add in the precise details of their retinue. It is more likely though 
that these were issued in duplicate, via the King's commissioners, to the 
most prominent men in each county or Lordship, and left for them to read 
and complete at their convenience. Upon completion they would be signed 
and sealed and returned to the King. This is supported by the evidence of 
a number of duplicate copies amongst the Indentures for 1492, but is 





A.E. Goodman, op.cit 
E101 72/3, 4, 5 & 6.
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There are ten sets of duplicates,only two of which were signed. 
None are identified by the indentured person being referred to in any 
other source. In all probability the recipient decided he had no 
intention of organising a retinue and was not sufficiently in awe of the 
King to keep such an opinion from him. In one particular case the 
recipient even went so far as to have his opinion recorded in writing on 
the reverse of one of the copies. ’Arthur Kenys’ stated his case thus:
'he hath paid all his money and (that) he never promised man, but 
only to pay his money as he was sessed by my lord chancellor'
Two others were also inscribed with messages for the King. Sir Edward 
Morris told the King that he:
'hath nothing wherewith to do the King service without help of his 
grace and as for his presence he is ready at all times.
John Parker, esquire, had an even better excuse, if it can be called that, 
for not finding a retinue. It was his wife who spoke for him stating that 
John:
'dwelleth in Chepstowe and he is 
lieth in peril of death by a fall
in the north country and there 
off a horse.
It is apparent that Henry did not receive unmitigated support, the 
evidence though indicates to the contrary that the population was 
generally willing to see the King support a good cause. The money was 
found and the largest army to leave England since Crecy was put upon





E101, 72/3 no.1092 & 72/4 no. 1107, 72/4 nos.1098 & 1099, 1100 & 
1101, 1110 & 1111, 1112 & 1113, 1114 & 1115, 1116 & 1117, 1118 & 
1119, 1120 & 72/5 no.112/72/5 nos. 1122 & 1123. The duplicate 
no.1122 and no.1123 were for Walter Hungerforde, yet he is 
identified as present though through payments of wages in Cope. 
Why he should return both copies, only one of which was signed, 









In the final analysis can we now state confidently and resolutely 
that Henry had organised the expedition of 1492 for one sole aim? What 
were its achievements? It was not a glorious incursion upon the French 
like some of its predecessors; no major engagements were fought; no great 
territories won and its stated aim was lost long before it departed. 
True, it was more successful than its immediate predecessor, the 
expedition of Edward IV in 1475, but its main success lay in the terms won 
at the Treaty of Etaples. That Henry Tudor gained official recognition 
from Charles VIII was no mean feat, while the removal of Warbeck as a 
threat with French support, a real one in 1492, helped secure Henry’s 
position and was the major achievement of the expedition. Financial 
success was more obvious, there was the pension from France and careful 
management and organisation had secured the bonus of a profit from the 
Parliamentary Benevolence. That this occurred was conceivably a greater 
surprise to Henry than to us, given our benefit of hindsight. All are 
important considerations when evaluating the nature of the success of the 
expedition, but what other conclusions can be drawn?
Despite the problems in precisely calculating the size of the army 
and navy, it is evident that both were approaching figures somewhat larger 
than any force that had previously sailed from England for more than a 
century. However, given the nature of continental military progress by 
1492 it is doubtful whether the English force could have matched up to any 
foreign opponent squarely without significant loss. Poynings and his 
troops had acquitted themselves well at Sluys, but the evidence is 
indicative of a force of picked troops, experienced and well equipped, 
possibly more so than the main army. Poynings, additionally, was fighting 
alongside experienced continental soldiers (against mercenaries of dubious 
quality) of the calibre of troops found in French armies of the period. 
The main English army, longbowmen and lesser men-at-arms, would not have 
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found the French so keen to connnit military suicide against well defended 
English positions as had happened at Agincourt and in other minor 
engagements during the Hundred Years War up to 1429. The French had 
learnt their lessons well, the English in contrast had still to learn 
theirs.
Cope's account sheds valuable light upon the care and thought 
expended upon the well being of the army. The amounts spent and 
quantities of supplies purchased reveal this; the troops would not suffer 
the indignities of food shortages and disease as had been the case in more 
than one previous invasion. Neither would they be dependent upon the 
locality for supplies except in desperate situations where fodder might 
have been required for the horses, and even then they took with them their 
own scythes.
Purchases show considerable thought, planning and foresight. 
Certain items reveal continuity of method within the accounting procedure 
such as the expenditure upon fourteen yards of green cloth to toll and 
account money on; the purchases of paper books to write in receipts and 
rolls of parchment for indenture bills.Other purchases indicate the 
progress made in military arts with expenditure on gunpowder and the 
necessary items for cannon and firearms.
The expedition proved to be a good testing ground both 
administratively and practically for this branch of Henry's army. Lessons 
were learnt and mistakes made that were not forgotten. The army collected 
for the war against Scotland reflects these lessons, the artillery arm was 
strengthened. Certain equipment was also included which was either
NOTES
1 E36/285, f53 
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neglected in 1492 or the references have been lost, that is rammers and 
charge ladels for the artillery, and scaling ladders should any siege be 
undertaken.1
Financially the organisation of Cope’s account reveals interesting 
facts for 1492. The increased use of the Chamber and its officials points 
to the slow return to dominance it enjoyed over the Exchequer during the 
Yorkist monarchies. Was the failure of the first Parliamentary grant to 
raise the required sum for the expenditure due to a lack of money in the 
country? Only approximately £27,000 was raised compared to the £75,000 
required. Yet there was wealth in England , the Benevolence raised nearly 
£50,000 yet Henry had to resort to the use of tenths and fifteenths in the 
end.
The tax and Benevolence returns indicate that by 1492 the decline 
in England’s nobility was not simply in numbers. Either their ability to 
support the crown financially had seriously depreciated or they were 
unwilling to do so and also unable to provide the large retinues needed 
and expected by the King. Although fifty-six peers were eligible to serve 
in 1492, thirty-four (61%) probably followed the King to France, none did 
so with a retinue approaching the size Henry V or Edward IV expected or 
received from their respective nobility. Significantly Henry V and Edward 
IV received considerable support from their brothers while Henry VII had 
no brothers or relatives capable of such support, even his uncle Jasper, 
Duke of Bedford, only sent a small force, he had to remain in England to 
assist the Regency Council.
NOTES
1. Naval Accounts and Inventories of the Reign of Henry VII, ed.,M.
Oppenheim in Naval Records Society, vol.VII, 1896, p84.
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Financially, the nobility gave very little money to aid the King 
in 1492. Of £48,488.16s.8d. collected through the Benevolence only 
£3431.6s.8d. came from the nobility, over £1500 from three women members 
(the Countess of Richmond and the duchesses of York^ and Norfolk). Only 
7.1% of the major financial source originated with the nobility, 3.1% from 
the male side. Had the aristocracy declined so much during the fifteenth 
century? It would appear so.
The key element here was that major financial and military support 
came not from those whom the King would most expect it, but from the 
lesser elements of the country; the knights, merchants and commoners. 
Militarily they supplied (of known retinues) 85.7% of the retinues 
providing 75.5% of the army. Financially they were significant, of the 
Benevolence alone they found 82% of the revenue, while in all probability 
they paid the largest proportion of the Parliamentary grants.
Expenditure reveals details in some variance with those who have 
believed the expenditure brought great profit for the King. No authority 
has categorically stated any amount, yet many have hinted at one. Dietz, 
accepted by most, indicates it was in the region of £155,000 , while 
Michael Van Cleeve Alexander comes closest when he refers to £132,000. 
The actual expenditure was higher than either assumed, but the overall 
profit of potentially £136,343 was significant. This sum was not realised 
at one time and was probably never known as such by Henry VII.
NOTES
1. The Duchess of York was Cecily, wife of Richard, duke of York, 
(1411-1500) mother of Edward IV and grandmother of Elizabeth, wife 
of Henry VII. She was born in 1415 and died in 1495.
2. English Governmental Finance, p57.
3. The First of the Tudors, ppl03-4.
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Of course we can be quite cynical about the whole expedition. We 
could see through the thin veneer of the preparations and organisation and 
see an entirely different picture. One of an army taken across the 
channel late in the season, in the knowledge that no French army would be 
present to oppose it, contrived to go through the motions to save the 
King’s face which was in danger of getting egg all over it through the 
failure of diplomatic negotiations to persuade allies to take the field 
with him. One which was intended to make money, not lose it, and did so 
quite successfully. Henry was an astute and extremely capable 
administrator, if not a military tactician. The idea of speculating to 
accumulate would have appealed to him and in effect this is what he 
accomplished. Perhaps this is too cynical an attitude to take?
The success of the analysis has depended upon the survival of two 
sources, William Cope’s Account, and William Hatcliffe's Repassage and 
Victuals Account. That they have survived has made this possible; that a 
significant part of the wages section in Cope has not has made a fuller 
analysis impossible. Yet together they have clarified the success of the 
expedition and the financial benefits reaped by Henry. They have allowed 
an insight into the problems faced in organising and supplying a late 
Medieval army as it embarked upon a campaign and how the finances were 
raised. That I term it Medieval rather than Renaissance is indicative of 
the military tactics it would have employed had it been called upon to 
take the field of battle, rather than a reflection of the thought and 
procedures employed in its organisation. In comparison to the campaigns 
of earlier monarchs the invasion of 1492 was a damp squib, yet financially 
and organisationally it reveals the potential for the later more 
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CALENDAR OF PATENT ROLLS HENRY Vll 1485-93, Vol.1, pp348-53.
7 JULY 1491 WESTMINSTER COMMISSIONERS TO REQUIRE BENEVOLENCE OF KING’S
SUBJECTS SENT TO THE FOLLOWING AREAS. THE COUNTIES OF:
CAMBRIDGE AND HUNTINGDON


















PRESTHEND, MELHENNETH, RADNOR, COMYTODER AND RADNOR,
ELWELD, CANTERSELLE, HAY OVYAS AND TALGARTH
BROMFORD AND BELT
MERYWNETH, CAERMARTYN AND ANGEESEA .
BREKENOKE
MOUNTGOMERY, KYRRY AND KYDDEWYN
POWES
DENBYGH AND CLONNE
HAWARDYN AND MOLLESDALE IN WALES
CARDIFF, GLAMORGAN AND MORGANNOK IN WALES
GOWER, ILANDE, USKE AND CARL YON,
OVERWENT, NETHERWENT AND COUNTY OF MERYONNTHIN
115APPENDIX B
Extract from the list of Benevolence payments made between 31 January 
1492 and 31 January 1501 found in E36/285, ffl2~31.










LORDS SPIRITUAL AND OTHER CLERGY:
PRIOR OF LEWES £100
ABBOT OF SAINT MARY'S ABBEY IN YORK £66.13s.4d.
PRIOR OF SAINT MARY’S ABBEY £66.13s.4d.
DEAN OF CHURCH OF SAINT PAUL'S £200
ABBOT OF CHERTSEY £133.6s.8d.
ABBOT OF WENSLEY1 £20
1. This is interesting. Knowles and Hadcock in their book Medieval 
Religious Houses, state it was a small college licenced in 1400 for 
Richard Lord Scroope of Bolton, for chaplains and 22 poor persons, 
but nothing was done until 1420 when his grandson Richard made a 
bequest for the building and endowment, but died the same year. 
Through this, and as nothing was heard of it, until now, Knowles and 
Hadcock have assumed, wrongly, that nothing came of the bequest. The 
fact that the Abbot could afford £20 is proof enough that it was a going concern in 1492.
PRIOR OF NEWARK £33.6s.8d.
ABBOT OF BERMONDSEY £20
ABBOT OF CHICHESTER £66.13s.4d.
PRIOR OF SAINT SWITHIN AT WINCHESTER £333.6s.8d.
EDMUND CHADERTON PROVOST £100
THOMAS RADLEY PROVOST £10
JOHN COKE ARCHDEACON OF LINCOLN £120
CHRISTOPHER TALBOT £40
NOTE
CLERKES : BOSTOCK PRIEST £60
MARTIN PRIEST £50
THOMAS BURWELT £33. 6s. 8d.
ROBERT TYWORTH 66s. 8d.
Sum £5523. 6s. 8d.
llg'
LORDS TEMPORAL:










LORD WILLOUGHBY de BROKE
LORD HASTINGS
LORD STRANGE
SIR WILLIAM HODY, BARON OF THE KING'S EXCHEQUER 
















'YET SUNDRIE PERSONNES OF THE LAISEE
SIR THOMAS PORLAND, KNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE COMMON
PLEAS £100
SIR REYNOLD BRAY £500
SIR THOMAS LOVELL £400
SIR THOMAS WEST, KNIGHT LORD DE LA WARE £200
SIR THOMAS COOKSEY £100
SIR ROGER CARROT £200
SIR EDWARD BERKELEY £120
SIR WILLIAM UVEDALE £ 66.13s.4d.
SIR WILLIAM 'RORES' £100
SIR JOHN FORTESCUE £ 14
SIR RHYS AP THOMAS £ 42
SIR WILLIAM 'DAWTENEY' £100
PIERS EDGECOMBE £ 50
JOHN SHAW £100
JOHN ZOUCHE £ 30
JOHN KNIGHT 'AUDITO' £ 10
ROBERT WHITE £ 48
JOHN AUDLEY £ 60
PIERS 'CARVONETT £ 40
NOTE BRONNE 'ESQUIRE' £ 20
1. These last two appear to be strangely placed as they were judges 
and not lords, but this is exactly as Cope lists them!
11?
PIERS CURTIS £ 60
JOHN SPEKE £ 80
JOHN COKE £ 30
.(THERE FOLLOWS A FURTHER 48 INDIVIDUAL ENTRIES)....
MASTER OF THE KING'S HOWES £432. 6s.
ALSO OF THE COLLECTORS OF THE LIKE BENEVOLENCE OF THE KING'S SUBJECTS
IN THE COUNTY OF:-




OXFORD, WILTSHIRE & BERKSHIRE £5748. 7s.l0d.
SOMERSET, DORSET £2439.16s. 3d.
DEVONSHIRE £ 179. 8s. 7d.
GLOUCESTERSHIRE £3004. 4s. 5d.
HEREFORDSHIRE £ 959.10s.
WORCESTERSHIRE £1786.19s.lOd.
SHROPSHIRE £ 190.13s. 8d.
WARWICKSHIRE £ 150.13s. 4d.
LEICESTERSHIRE £ 948.11s. Id.
NOTTINGHAMSHIRE £1337. 18d.
DERBYSHIRE £ 652. 8d.
LINCOLNSHIRE £3356. 8d.
YORKSHIRE £ 969. 7s. Id.
NORTHAMPTONSHIRE £ 91.
LONDON MERCHANTS £1059.11s. 8d.
FOREIGNERS OF LONDON £ 400.19s.
ESSEX £ 194.19s.10d.
HERTFORDSHIRE £ 49.10s.
NORFOLK AND SUFFOLK £2737. 9s.l0d.
SUM OF ALL BENEVOLENCES £48488.16s. 8d.
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APPENDIX C
TABLE SHOWING NUMBERS & RATIOS OF MEN-AT-ARMS TO ARCHERS IN THE ARMY OF 1492
INDENTURED CONTINGENT LEADERS No.
MEN-A1
AW ARCHERS*
AVERAGE NO.PER LEADER 
M24-AT-ARMS ARCHERS





4. ŒNILÎNEN AND OTHERS
5. TOTAL
ACTUAL CONTINGENTS AS 
SHOWN BY POPE & HATCLIFFE
6. LORDS & SPIRITUAL L0RD6
7. KNIGHTS
8. SQUIRES & RELIGIOUS
FERSON'EL
9. OFFICERS & MINISIERS OF
ROYAL HOUSEHOLD















































ACTUAL INCREASE OVER 
PROMISES BY LEADERS 
INDENTED & PAID WAGES





















Of the remaining 35
Indentured Retinue
Leaders 11 can be posi­
tively identified as 
present throq^i 
Hatcliffe's account 
ar through references 
in Cope.
* Including those listed as others, shown 
Separately as |____ |
# Including spears and demilancers
lié
APPENDIXC (continued)
INDENIURED OONirNtENT LEADERS No
MEN-AT- 
ARMS # ARCHERS*
AVERAGE NO.PER LEADER RATIO CF ARŒERS 
TO MEN-AT-ARMSMEN-AT-ARMS ARCHERS
17.ATIRIBUnNG THE SAfrE % 
INCREASE TO THE REMAINING 
INDENTURED CAPTAINS 35 -352(-»4) 1054(+153) 10 30 3
18 .OTHER RETINUE CAPTAINS ARE 
KNOWN THROUGH OOPE & HAT- 
CLIFFE BUT THEIR RETINUES 
ARE UNKNOWN ALLOWING
THE SAME RATIO AS 11 .WE 
HAVE:- 36 327 1872 9 52 Si
19.THE TOJAL ARMY SIZE CAN BE 
CONSTRUCTED ADDING 11+17 
+ 18 . ? 206 1930 10,086
20.® AS SHOWN BY TEE WACES 
CALCULATION 208 2125 10,153
THE PARAMETERS FOR THE ARMY
ARE BETWEEN 19 & 20 FOR 206 RETINUES FOR 208 RETINUES
TOTAL NEN-AT-ARNS, LEADERS 
AND ARCHERS 12016 12278
AED CUSTRELLS, PAGES AND 
OTHER ATTENDANTS 603 677
ADD TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
(TRANSPORT MINERS, 
BLACKSMITHS, CARFENIERS AND 
MEDICAL) 561 561
13240 13516
PUJS SECRETARIES, COUNCILLORS, 
ROYAL SERVANTS
POSSIBLY 10% - 12% 1324 1352
GRAND TOTAL 14564 14868
IF WE ALSO INCLUDE THE
BURTON ABBEY REGISTER RETINUES, 
TOTAL MEN-AT-ARMS, LEADERS
AND ARCHERS
ADD CUSTRELLS, PAGES AND OTHER 
ATTENDANTS
ADD TECHNICAL PERSONNEL (TRANSPORT 








PLUS SECRETARIES, COUNCILLORS, 






EXTRACTS FROM THE BOOK OF ORDNANCES ISSUED BY HENRY VI1 BETWEEN OCTOBER
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APPENDIX E
FINANCE FOR HENRY VlT's EXPEDITION ACCORDING TO COPE’S ACCOUNT
f. INCOME £ s. d.
1-4 Sum of tenths and fifteenths from the Clergy 9828 10 4
4-5 Sum of the tenths of the Clergy 2073 9 4
6-7 Sum of the Benevolences of Lords Spritual and
Clergy 5523 6 8
7 -14 Sum of the Benevolences of the Lords Temporal
and others 39838 19 7
Benevolence money accounted on missing pages 3126 10 5
14 Sum o.f all Benevolences 48488 16 8
14 At the King's Mint during the 7th year 17392 15 0
15-17 Foreign receipts 3782 4 1
17 Sum of Foreign receipts 21174 19 1
17 Sum of Almaner receipts £81565 15 6
EXPENDITURE
18-50 Wages of War. (No sum mentioned). 14295 3 1
With up to 32 pages of Wages of War missing
total should include 7982 12 9
50-78 Yet Necessities. All foreign Payments 48802 18 11
71-80 Money delivered to the King's Chamber 10485 0 9
80 Sum of Almaner Payments £81(565 15 6)
Amounts shown in bold type are 
pages, or are unclear due to
those presumably found upon the missing 
damage in the original.
